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ABSTRACT 
The fragmented approach of provinces in the use of legislation and policies, coupled with the 
uncertainty of key terms in the context of section 139(1) of the Constitution, have resulted in 
provincial executives not being consistent or not always complying with the use of the steps 
necessary for interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. In order to assess 
the impact of the fragmented approach and uncertainties on how provincial executives apply 
the abovementioned steps, this study answers eight questions designed to test the way in 
which provincial executives applied the aforementioned steps and the effectiveness of the use 
of aforementioned interventions. The assessment is based on the tallies from the answers to 
the eight questions, and the grouping of these answers in accordance with the tallies. Each of 
the three main groups characterises how the relevant provincial executives applied the steps 
necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution for the 
last five years. The fourth group assesses the effectiveness of such interventions. The answers 
are derived from the data relating to the notices to the Minister and NCOP, and 
complemented by the progress reports from the Minister and NCOP. The findings of the four 
groupings are as follows: the first group presented the steps which present no difficulty in 
terms of compliance; the second group presented the steps which provincial executives 
mostly complied with but which at times present some difficulty; and the third group 
presented those steps which are problematic. The fourth group determined that the 
effectiveness of the role of provinces in the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of 
the Constitution is questionable due to the repetition and duration of a number of 
interventions. In order to address the issue of non-compliance by provincial executives with 
the steps necessary for the use of interventions, the study recommends the drafting of 
legislation and formulation of clear policy guidelines which will ensure a consistent, coherent 
and uniform approach when invoking interventions.  
 
Key words: Role of provinces, Invoke, Interventions, Constitution, Corrective measures, 
Executive obligations, Local government, Directive, Assumption of responsibilities, 
Procedural requirements. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1 Problem statement 
The Constitution provides for provinces to ‘strengthen the capacity of municipalities to 
manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions’.1 The 
Constitutional Court placed the support given by provinces to local government within a 
supervisory context when it stated that ‘the provinces must assert legislative and executive 
power to promote the development of local government … and may assert such powers by 
regulating municipal executive authority, to see to the effective performance by 
municipalities’.2 In this regard, De Visser and Steytler state that provincial executives should 
have the discretion to exercise intervention measures as a ‘necessary measure when a 
municipality fails to govern and thus jeopardises the enterprise of development’.3 Section 139 
of the Constitution provides for the provincial executive to take any ‘appropriate steps to 
ensure the fulfilment of the failed executive obligations’.4 These steps are defined in section 
139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution as: the issuing of the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a); 
the assumption of responsibility in terms of section 139(1)(b); and the dissolution of the 
council in terms of section 139(1)(c).  
In the case of Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and 
Others the High Court held that the steps taken by the relevant authority in terms of section 
139(1) ‘must be appropriate and therefore fit the situation’ in order to ensure the fulfilment of 
the failed obligation.5 Due regard should therefore be given to the nature of the executive 
obligation that was not fulfilled, the interests of those affected, and the interests of the 
municipality concerned. Due regard should also be given to the extent of the corrective 
                                                 
1 S 154 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 1996 Constitution). 
2 In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 371. 
3 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa (2012): 15-18 (2). 
4 S 139 (1) 1996 Constitution. 
5 Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and Others (231/2009) [2009] ZAE. 
   para 68 (hereafter Mnquma). 
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measures which serve to ensure the problems are resolved.6 In the absence of policy 
directives and clear guidelines the provinces have been unclear about how to interpret these 
requirements and therefore uncertain of how to apply such requirements when intervening in 
terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution.  
Due to the above, there is uncertainty with regard to the role of provinces when they follow 
the procedural requirements necessary for the use of interventions in terms of sections 139(1) 
(a)-(c) of the Constitution. The Mnquma judgement, discussion documents by the South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA),7 as well as the Fifth National Municipal 
Managers Forum (NMMF)8 on April 2013 indicated that there were various uncertainties 
with the application of the steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 
139(1) of the Constitution. This is especially true with the application of key terms in 
subsection (1) of section 139 such as ‘appropriate steps’ and ‘executive obligations’. For 
example, in Mnquma Judge Van Zyl held that the provincial executive wrongly considered 
the failure by the municipality to constitute executive obligations when he stated that the 
‘executive obligations are confused with the statutory obligations’.9  
Due to the aforementioned confusion, the dissolution in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the 
Constitution in Mnquma was declared invalid and set aside. Furthermore, the NMMF and 
discussion documents by SALGA, which had been developed from empirical data and 
lessons learned from past interventions, stated that directives in terms of section 139(1)(a) 
were often not issued due to the uncertainties. What is not clear is whether these uncertainties 
apply to all the procedural steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 
139(1)(a)-(c) or if they apply to only some – and if so, which? This thesis addresses this 
issue. It focuses on how in the last five years provincial executives followed the steps 
necessary for interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). The aim of the study is to 
determine the role of provinces in the use of these interventions.  
                                                 
6 Mnquma para 75. 
7 South African Local Government The Application of sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: The need for  
   legislation in terms of sections 100(3) and 139(8) (2014) 6.  
8 South African Local Government Association Fifth National Municipal Managers Forum 
   Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Interventions Bill (2013).  
9 Mnquma para 65. 
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2 Background of the study 
Since the first intervention in 1999 by the Eastern Cape Provincial Executive in the 
Butterworth Transitional Local Council, not much data has been collated to assess how 
provinces have used interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution. 
Various authors have written about some of the uncertainties and challenges relating to 
section 139(1) interventions.  
De Visser argues that one of the challenges relating to the duration of the intervention is that 
a ‘minimum intervention approach’10 should be adopted, meaning that the intervention 
should cease once the reasons for the intervention no longer exist. Further to this, De Visser 
argues that the provincial executive, when resorting to section 139 interventions, must be 
guided by the principles of co-operative government.11 In this regard he says that the NCOP 
plays a supervisory as well as a controlling role and should end the intervention when it is of 
the opinion that the continued intervention infringes on the institutional integrity of the 
municipality. It follows that the intervention should not only end as soon as possible but 
‘should also occur in the least intrusive manner’.12 
Steytler contends that section 139 interventions should have three aims.13 He argues that one 
of the aims should be consultation and resorting to the intervention as a measure of last 
resort. Also, the integrity of local government as an independent sphere of government is 
important and should serve to protect municipalities from provincial interference. Lastly, he 
claims that the aim of the interventions should be restorative rather than punitive. Provinces 
should exhaust all avenues of consultation to remedy the failed obligations and be mindful of 
local governments’ institutional integrity before they resort to section 139 interventions.  
                                                 
10 De Visser J A Legal Analysis of Provincial Intervention in a Municipality (LLM thesis, University of the  
    Western Cape, 1999) 40. 
11 De Visser J A Legal Analysis of Provincial Intervention in a Municipality (LLM thesis, University of the  
    Western Cape, 1999) 19. 
12 De Visser J A Legal Analysis of Provincial Intervention in a Municipality (LLM thesis, University of the  
    Western Cape, 1999) 39. 
13 Steytler N ‘Establishing a regulatory framework for provincial intervention in terms of section 139 of the  
    Constitution’ available at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 7 July 2013). 
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Mettler argues that the practice of intergovernmental relations between the three spheres of 
government was seen as in its ‘infancy’ stage when interventions were initiated in 1998.14 In 
this regard, he argues there is now a window of opportunity to shape the relations in such a 
way that it ‘facilitates the obligations placed at the door of provincial government in relation 
to local government’.15 In his view some challenges that relate to interventions are due to the 
fragmented pieces of legislation which can be associated with the supporting mechanisms of 
section 139 interventions. A more serious problem, he argues, is the fact that some of the 
legislation dates from the advent of the 1996 Constitution so that some aspects, particularly 
the part concerning intervention, do not comply with section 139 of the Constitution.16 There 
is thus an overwhelming need to establish a coherent, uniform and effective system in terms 
of section 139 interventions, which in Mettler’s view is indispensable for the successful 
outcomes of such interventions. 
The Constitution grants the NCOP and the Minister considerable powers over interventions in 
view of the oversight role. Section 139(2) and (3) state that the Minister and NCOP should 
approve the intervention within specified time-frames and should they not approve or 
disapprove the intervention within these time-frames such interventions should end. Further 
to this, the NCOP is tasked to ‘review the intervention regularly and make any appropriate 
recommendations to the provincial executive’.17 According to Murray and Hoffman-
Wanderer, the NCOP expanded its oversight role and adapted it to that of an 
intergovernmental facilitator, thus providing cooperation between different spheres of 
government and assisting in resolution of conflicts outside the courtroom’.18 Murray and 
Hoffman-Wanderer argue that in assuming such facilitating roles there are ‘no formal rules or 
written procedures governing the assessment of an intervention by the NCOP’.19 For this 
                                                 
14 Mettler J ‘Provincial-municipal relations: A few challenges’ (2006) vol 7 (2) Law, Democracy &  
    Development 12. 
15 Mettler J ‘Provincial-municipal relations: A few challenges’ (2006) vol 7 (2) Law, Democracy &  
     Development 6. 
16 Mettler J ‘Provincial-municipal relations: A few challenges’ (2006) vol 7 (2) Law, Democracy & 
      Development 6. 
17 S 139(2)(c) 1996 Constitution. 
18 Murray, C., & Hoffman-Wanderer, Y. (2007). The National Council of Provinces and provincial intervention    
     in local government. Stellenbosch Law Review= Stellenbosch Regstydskrif, 18(1), 10  
19 Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer (2007), The National Council of Provinces and Provincial Intervention in  
    Local  Government 20. 
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reason she claims that the ‘NCOP committees in their oversight roles tend to be flexible’.20 
For example, she argues that they do not ‘insist upon the issuance of a formal directive, 
neither do they scrutinise the specific grounds cited as justification for the intervention’.21 
Thus the legislative provisions that the municipality are not complying with may not be 
precisely stated. 
In March 2013 at the Fifth NMMF, the salient features for the development of the 
Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Intervention Bill were presented by SALGA to 
the Forum. One of these features focused on the uncertainties with regard to the procedural 
requirements by provinces in terms of section 139 interventions. For example, it was 
observed by the Forum that directives were often not issued by provinces due to uncertainties 
with regard to the procedural requirements. Other important features related to the incapacity 
of provinces to deal with their mandate of supporting local government, such as lack of skills 
and funds. Also, that there was a lack of targeted monitoring and oversight before the 
invocation of section 139 interventions. This meant that the effectiveness of the interventions 
was questioned as it was not clear if the interventions were curative or simply temporary 
takeovers. In addition, there was little indication that the provincial legislatures exercised 
oversight over the provincial executive’s actions in regard to section 139 interventions. The 
Forum concluded that had the proper support and monitoring mechanisms been in place, 
early warning systems would have prevented at least some of these interventions.22 
The abovementioned authors and presentations have dealt normatively with the challenges 
and uncertainties related to the role of provinces in terms of section 139 interventions. What 
is lacking though is the data analysis or evidence to ascertain the impact of the uncertainties 
on the use of the procedural requirements in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). This study seeks 
to fill this gap by analysing the data for the last five years which relates to the use of 
interventions by provinces in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). It does so by assessing the 
information available in the notices to the Minister and NCOP and progress reports from the 
NCOP. The information from these sources serves to determine whether or not provinces 
complied with the procedural requirements necessary for such interventions in the last five 
                                                 
20 Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer (2007), The National Council of Provinces and Provincial Intervention in  
     Local    Government 20. 
21 Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer (2007), The National Council of Provinces and Provincial Intervention in  
     Local     Government 21. 
22 South African Local Government Association (2013). Fifth National Municipal Managers Forum:  
     Intergovernmental Monitoring Support and Interventions Bill. 
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years but also assesses the role of provinces in the use of interventions in terms of section 
139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution. 
3 Significance of the problem 
The provision of basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity are essential for most 
communities, especially those in disadvantaged areas. It is for this reason that any 
uncertainties which could hamper or delay the provision of such services could result in 
protests and violence from dissatisfied communities. To avoid the unnecessary loss of lives 
and costs associated with protests, identifying and solving the problems related to the steps 
necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution is 
therefore of extreme importance to both provinces and municipalities.  
Provinces must use section 139 interventions as a last resort in order to restore essential basic 
services in those municipalities which are in distress. Should these measures prove to be 
ineffective, it could result in municipalities feeling the wrath of dissent from communities for 
lack of service delivery. Such dissent usually leads to communities staging protest actions 
which ultimately erupt into violent uprisings. A recent study by the Community Law Centre 
of the University of the Western Cape presented data which indicated that the countrywide 
protests could largely be attributed to protesters being aggrieved with municipalities not 
providing basic services to communities.23 These protest actions not only increased in 
frequency in 2012 but in most instances turned violent.24 Even though the study did not link 
the protest actions to the non-fulfilment of executive obligations, municipalities as the closest 
form of government to communities would feel the brunt of such violent protest actions. 
Furthermore, should the role of provinces to support and monitor local government be 
constrained or hampered as a result of provincial executives not complying with the 
procedural requirements, the interventions could be prolonged and the cost of the intervention 
to the municipalities increased. Clearer procedures for section 139 interventions would enable 
provinces to apply the interventions in a more uniform and effective manner. This in turn 
would lead to provinces restoring essential basic services more speedily in those 
municipalities experiencing difficulties, thereby saving costs and curbing uprisings. 
                                                 
23 De Visser J et al ‘MLGI Protest Barometer’ (2012) 7 vol 14 (3) Local Government Bulletin. 
24 De Visser J et al ‘MLGI Protest Barometer’ (2012) 7 vol 14 (3) Local Government Bulletin. 
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4 Research questions 
The main research question of this study is this: how do provinces use the instrument of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1)-(c) of the Constitution? The study addresses this 
question by way of two subquestions:  
i) Have provinces followed the procedural requirements necessary when 
intervening in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c)? 
ii) Which of the procedural requirements were particularly difficult to comply with 
when provincial executives applied the steps necessary for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c)? 
5 Answer and argument 
The answers to the above research questions are determined by analysing the data which 
relates to interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) over the last five years. More 
specifically, the answers will be derived by analysing data concerning: the reasons forwarded 
by the relevant provinces justifying the interventions; the legal basis for invoking the 
interventions; notices and dates of the notices to the interested parties; the dates of prior 
notices; the dates of interventions; the dates for dis/approval of interventions by the Minister 
and National Council of Provinces; and requests for extensions of the interventions. This data 
allows the study to assess whether provinces complied with the procedural steps necessary to 
invoke interventions in terms of sections 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution for the last five 
years.  
The necessary procedural steps are as follows: the use of the directive; the issuing of the prior 
notice; the notices to the Minister and the NCOP; identifying the failure in relation to the 
‘executive obligation’; approving or disapproving the intervention; requests for extension for 
the interventions. The second purpose of the data will then come into play in that such data is 
used to answer the research questions mentioned above. For example, if the data indicates 
that the legal basis for the intervention by the province was based on the assumption of 
responsibilities in terms of section 139(1)(b), the study would check if the relevant province 
issued prior notices to allow the municipality to make representations. The study would then 
check if the Minister for Local Government, the provincial legislature and the NCOP had 
been notified within the time-frames specified in the Constitution. The dates for the approvals 
or disapprovals by the Minister and the NCOP are also checked for compliance with the time-
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frames. The findings will indicate which of the procedural requirements in terms of section 
139(1)(b) were complied with and which not. In this way the data which relates to research 
questions (i)-(iii) allows an assessment of how provinces used interventions in terms of 
section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution and which requirements were complied with. The 
study analyses data available from those provinces that have invoked sections 139(1)(a)-(c) 
of the Constitution in the period January 2009 to March 2014.  
6 Methodology  
This is a desktop study which focuses on an analysis of primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources are policy documents, legislation and official documents. The NCOP, 
COGTA, SALGA and the relevant provincial authorities furnish the information which 
relates to the use of intervention in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution for the 
last five years. Secondary source material includes the work of authors that focuses on the 
role of provinces in the use of interventions in terms of section 139 of the Constitution. 
The data mentioned above is used to assess which of the procedural steps provided for in 
section 139 of the Constitution were complied with and which not. More specifically, these 
procedural steps relate to: the directive issued in terms of section 139(1)(a); the assumption of 
responsibilities in terms of section 139(1)(b); and the dissolution of the municipal council in 
terms of section 139(1)(c). Each of the section 139(1)(a)-(c) interventions for the last five 
years would be assessed against the steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of 
section 139(1) of the Constitution. The statistics derived from the data establish the trends 
and patterns for the use of interventions by provinces in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the 
Constitution for the last five years.  
7 Limitations  
The study relies on information retrieved from the notices to the Minister and the NCOP 
which contain information relating to the intervention in terms of section 139 (1) of the 
Constitution. In addition, information contained in the progress reports from the NCOP and 
COGTA pertaining to these interventions were also used for the study where necessary. 
These notices and reports were scanned and emailed to the researcher by the NCOP and 
COGTA in Pretoria. This created problems for the researcher as certain notices or reports 
required for the study would either be missing or information illegible or omitted. Where 
notices or reports of certain interventions were not available the information required to 
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answer certain questions was lacking and the subsequent questions could not be answered. 
This impacted severely on the answers to some questions, specifically the dates for the 
approvals by the Minister and the NCOP. The answers to such questions therefore indicate 
‘uncertain’. In addition, where the information on the notices or reports was illegible or 
omitted (such as dates for notices, approvals or disapprovals) and where such information 
was required to answer certain questions, the answers once again indicate ‘uncertain’.  
8 Organisation of the study 
Chapter One provides the problem statement, significance of the problem, research questions, 
answer and argument to the problem, literature survey, substantiation of the argument and the 
methodology. Chapter Two deals with the legal framework for section 139 of the 
Constitution, particularly the procedural requirements that provincial executives have to 
comply with when it uses the instrument of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of 
the Constitution. Chapter Three presents the data which relates to the use of the procedural 
steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). Such data is 
available from NCOP, COGTA and SALGA as well as those provinces that intervened in 
municipalities for the last five years. Chapter Four analyses the data presented in Chapter 
Three and the data which relates to research questions (i)-(iii). Chapter Five provides the key 
findings of the study and makes recommendations in response to the uncertainties and 
challenges relating to section 139(1)(a)-(c) interventions. 
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Chapter Two 
Framework for Section 139(1) Interventions 
1 Introduction 
According to De Visser and Steytler, ‘interventions serve as a necessary measure to govern 
when a municipality fails to govern’ by providing support with regard to the delivery of 
services and good governance for those local authorities which are in distress.25 The 
Constitutional Court in the Second Certification judgement stated that the provincial 
executive ‘is fully entitled, if not obliged, to do what is necessary to ensure that the 
Constitution and legislation consistent with the Constitution are adhered to’.26 The 1996 
Constitution thus provides for three types of intervention. First, section 139(1) of the 
Constitution provides for regular intervention ‘where a municipality fails to fulfil an 
executive obligation’, which is a provincial discretionary intervention. Secondly, in terms of 
section 139(4), if the municipality fails to approve a budget or any revenue raising measures 
the relevant provincial executive must intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure 
that the budget or revenue raising measures are approved. This is a mandatory intervention 
and includes the dissolution of the municipal council. Lastly, in terms of section 139(5) the 
provincial executive is obliged to intervene in instances ‘where a municipality admits it is 
unable to, or due to a crisis in its financial affairs, is in breach to provide services or meet its 
financial obligations’. The use of each of these section 139 interventions is circumscribed by 
rules and principles and must take place in the spirit of sound intergovernmental relations.27 
This thesis looks specifically at the role of provinces when it applies the steps necessary for 
the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. Hence, it is important 
to understand the various rules and principles which have to be applied by provincial 
executives in the use of section 139(1) interventions. In Mnquma Local Municipality and 
Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and Others, section 139(1) formed the subject matter 
of the dispute between the litigating parties and addressed some of the most important aspects 
                                                 
25 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-18 (2). 
26 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Amended Text of the  
    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 para 118. 
27 S 41(h) 1996 Constitution. 
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in the context of subsection 1 of section 139 of the Constitution. Thus, this chapter first 
provides an interpretation of key words such as ‘the failure to fulfil an executive obligation’, 
as well as the rules and principles which apply when provincial executives use interventions 
in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. Thereafter, the chapter looks at the application 
of each ‘appropriate step’ in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) as well as the procedural 
requirements that the Constitution prescribes for the various types of interventions. Lastly, it 
summarises the steps necessary when provincial executives use interventions in terms of 
section 139(1) of the Constitution. These steps are designed in the form of questions with the 
aim to assess if provincial executives followed the steps necessary for the use of interventions 
in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution.  
2 Interpretation of section 139(1)  
According to Van Zyl J in Mnquma, the wording of subsection 1 of section 139 is ‘central to 
a determination of the validity of the decision to intervene’28 in a municipality. The wordings 
which are of importance in the context of subsection 1 section 139 are discussed below.  
2.1 Failure to fulfil an executive obligation 
Subsection (1) of section 139 provides that the provincial executive may intervene ‘when a 
municipality cannot or does not fulfil its executive obligations in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation’. From this context the provincial executive is only allowed to intervene when the 
municipality fails to fulfil an executive obligation. In Mnquma, Van Zyl J states that this 
‘statutory precondition or jurisdictional fact is a necessary prerequisite’ and therefore needs 
to be in ‘existence’ before the provincial executive may exercise its authority to intervene.29 
In South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice Corbett J says that 
the ‘jurisdictional fact consists of a fact, or state of affairs, which objectively speaking, must 
have existed before the statutory power could validly be exercised’.30 The Mnquma 
judgement makes it clear that the existence of the jurisdictional fact in terms of section 
139(1) is not left to the ‘discretion of the provincial executive but is an objective fact which is 
independently triable by a Court’.31 Furthermore, the High Court in Mnquma held that the 
                                                 
28 Mnquma para 17. 
28 Mnquma para 49. 
30 South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 31 (A) at 34 A to 35 D. 
31 Mnquma para 50. 
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‘duty is on the authority concerned (which in terms of section 139(1) is the provincial 
executive) … to satisfy the Court that the required jurisdictional fact did in fact exist’, and the 
Court may declare the intervention invalid if it concludes differently.32  
Further, it is clear from subsection (1) of section 139 that the failure by the municipality must 
relate to an executive obligation. In Mnquma Van Zyl J states that the failure by the 
municipality to fulfil an executive obligation includes ‘the inability to effectively fulfil an 
executive obligation’.33 In his view the failure to fulfil an executive obligation should as a 
result include the ‘situation where the municipality attempted to perform an executive 
obligation but was unsuccessful’.34 However, Van Zyl J in Mnquma cautions that ‘relating 
the failure by the municipality to an executive obligation is problematic’.35 In this regard, the 
High Court judge in Mnquma cautions that ‘executive obligations are at times confused with 
the statutory obligations or duties’ of the municipality.36 In the judge’s view the statutory 
obligation is aimed at ensuring the effective performance of executive obligations and does 
not necessarily result in failure to fulfil an executive obligation.37 Hence, Van Zyl J in 
Mnquma argues that the mayor’s failure to submit an annual performance report of the 
various departments constitutes non-compliance with a statutory obligation but does not 
necessarily result in failure to fulfil an executive obligation. In Mnquma the High Court 
determined that the ‘alleged failure was wrongly considered to constitute an executive 
obligation’ and the decision to dissolve the municipality was declared invalid by the Court.38 
What is clear in Mnquma is that the term ‘executive obligation’ in the context of subsection 
139(1) was a contentious issue between the litigating parties. This has led to Van Zyl J in 
Mnquma charging that the ‘executive obligation is problematic’ and that the counsel for the 
respective parties expressed different opinions about the definition of the term.39 In order to 
provide more clarity with regard to the term ‘executive obligation’ the High Court in 
Mnquma holds that the ‘type of failures that empower the provincial executive to intervene 
                                                 
32 Mnquma para 50. 
33 Mnquma para 52. 
34 Mnquma para 52. 
35 Mnquma para 54. 
36 Mnquma para 65. 
37 Mnquma para 65. 
38 Mnquma para 90. 
39 Mnquma para 54 
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are limited to those obligations that are executive in nature’.40 In Mnquma Van Zyl J further 
states that the meaning accorded to the word ‘‘executive obligation’ must be found within 
and against the background of the constitutional framework of the sections dealing with local 
government’.41 Thus, the judge in Mnquma contends the word is ‘used in the context of an 
obligation of a public nature that is imposed on a municipality in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation’.42 The Constitution mandates local government to provide basic services and 
improve the well-being of members of its communities.43 Thus, the executive decisions of 
municipal councils will ordinarily have a direct effect on the lives and opportunities of those 
living in the communities, for example a service such as waste management. This is 
illustrated in section 139(1)(b) which links the executive obligation to the ‘maintaining of 
essential national standards or meeting established minimum standards for the rendering of a 
service’.44  
At local government level there is no separation of executive and legislative functions and 
both the executive and legislative authority of the municipality are vested in its municipal 
council.45 Thus, municipal councils exercise both the executive and legislative functions 
which include: local government matters listed in Part B of schedule 4 and Part B of schedule 
5;46 any other matter assigned to municipals by national or provincial legislation;47 and the 
making and administering of by-laws.48 The duties of local government to provide services at 
a local level is ‘exercised within these functional areas with the aim … to implement and 
administer legislation in relation thereto, provide the services associated therewith, provide 
an administration to do so, develop policy in relation thereto and initiating by-laws to 
effectively govern within these functional areas’.49 In Mnquma Van Zyl J states that this view 
is confirmed by section 11(3) of the Municipal Systems Act and corroborates what is meant 
                                                 
15 Mnquma para 64. 
41 Mnquma para 59. 
42 Mnquma para 57. 
43 Ss 152, 153 1996 Constitution. 
44 S 139(1)(b)(i) 1996 Constitution. 
45 S 152 1996 Constitution. 
46 S 156(1)(a) 1996 Constitution. 
47 S 156(1)(b) 1996 Constitution. 
48 S 156(2) 1996 Constitution. 
49 Mnquma para 64. 
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by the term ‘executive obligation’.50 Therefore, local government’s duty to provide and 
administer services is closely associated with the ‘executive obligations’ of municipalities.  
2.2 ‘Appropriate steps’       
Once the provincial executive has decided to intervene, the provincial executive has the 
discretion to apply the ‘appropriate step’ to remedy the failure at the municipality. Section 
139(1) provides that the provincial executive may intervene by taking ‘any appropriate steps’, 
which include issuing a directive to the municipality;51 the assumption of responsibility for 
the relevant obligation;52 and the dissolution of the municipal council.53 In Mnquma the High 
Court held that these appropriate steps are ‘alternative forms of interventions’54 and as such 
the ‘intervention must fit the particular circumstances of the case’.55 Accordingly, the 
Mnquma judgement stated that the appropriate step ‘must take into consideration the nature 
of the executive obligation that was not fulfilled, the interests of those affected and the 
interests of the affected municipality’.56 
Another appropriate step would arise when the provincial executive has no other recourse 
than court action to execute the obligation. For example, the municipal council of the 
Abaqulusi Municipality refused to accept the election of a councillor even after a section 
139(1)(a) directive instructed it to do so.57 However, there is still much uncertainty as to what 
constitutes an ‘appropriate step’, as was highlighted in the discussion document by 
SALGA.58 This issue will be further explored in the chapters that follow. 
                                                 
50 Mnquma para 64. 
51 S 139(1)(a) 1996 Constitution. 
52 S 139(1)(b) 1996 Constitution. 
53 S 139(1)(c) 1996 Constitution. 
54 Mnquma para 72. 
55 Mnquma para 75. 
56 Mnquma para 75. 
57 .Provincial Government of KwaZulu Natal: Notice in terms of section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
     2013/03/20  
58 South African Local Government The Application of sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: The need for  
    legislation in terms of sections 100(3) and 139(8) (2014) 6. 
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3 Rules and principles when using section 139(1) interventions  
When provincial executives institute corrective measures in terms of section 139(1) of the 
Constitution, important rules and principles have to be adhered to. The power to intervene is 
a discretionary one, indicated by the use of the word ‘may’ in subsection (1) of section 139. 
Should the provincial executive intervene in terms of section 139(1) the discretionary 
measures exercised by the provincial executive should be suited to the situation, which is 
premised on a ‘rational relationship between the exercise of the power and the purpose for 
which it was given’.59 It is clear therefore that even though section 139(1) makes provision 
for the provincial executive to take any appropriate step to fulfil the executive obligation the 
provincial executive is not obliged to exercise it.  
Chapter Three of the Constitution emphasises that the principle of cooperative governance 
and intergovernmental relations should be ‘observed and adhered to by national, provincial 
and local spheres of government’60 as all the spheres are ‘distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated’.61 In Mnquma the judge correctly alluded to the fact that cooperative governance 
not only relates to the provision of support and assistance to local governments, but also 
involves an aspect of supervision.62 In the same way, section 155(6)(a)-(b) of the 
Constitution provides for the provincial governments to monitor and support local 
government as well as promote the development of local government to perform their own 
affairs.  
In addition to the above, section 151(2) of the Constitution also provides for the municipality 
to govern on its own initiative the local government affairs of its community.63 This 
autonomous nature of municipalities is further underlined by section 151(4), which provides 
that ‘national and provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s 
functions’. Thus, in Mnquma Van Zyl J stated that local government enjoys a ‘measure of 
self-government, is mandated to be developmental and functions in co-operation with and 
                                                 
59 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA: In Re: Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa supra at para    
    [90]. 
60 S 40(2) 1996 Constitution.  
61 S 40(1) 1996 Constitution. 
62 Mnquma para 45. 
63 S 151(3) 1996 Constitution. 
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under the supervision of national and provincial governments’.64 It is important that when the 
provincial executive resorts to any intervention measures it respects the autonomous sphere 
of local government. For example, ‘where intervention takes the form of dissolution, the 
municipal council is to ensure that no inroads are made without good reason (exceptional 
circumstances) into the autonomy of local sphere of government’.65 In Mnquma the High 
Court held that the way the provincial executive applied the intervention was an 
encroachment on the autonomy of the municipality which ultimately contributed to the 
declaration by the Court to invalidate the decision to dissolve the Municipal Council.66 
Finally, it is imperative that the provincial executive addresses only the ‘present and not past 
failures’ in municipalities when it identifies the failed executive obligation.67 In the City of 
Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape Swain J stated that the nature of the failure of the 
obligation should be ‘framed in the present tense, being concerned with an on-going failure 
and not a past failure’.68 This view was echoed in Mnquma when the High Court disapproved 
of the provincial executive’s reliance on past failures.69 The steps necessary for each of the 
appropriate steps in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) will be discussed below. 
4 Applying the ‘appropriate steps’ in terms of section 139(1)  
4.1 Prior notice before the intervention 
Before applying any of the ‘appropriate steps’ in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) a municipality 
should have the opportunity to respond to the concerns which relate to the failure to fulfil the 
executive obligations. This is line with the audi alter partem rule which is fundamental to 
South African law and affords the affected party the chance to voice their opinion with regard 
to the concerns raised. Furthermore, Chapter Three of the Constitution, which deals with 
intergovernmental relations, requires all organs of government to have respect for each 
                                                 
64Mnquma para 48. 
65 Mnquma para 79. 
66 Mnquma para 100. 
67 Mnquma para 53. 
68 City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape and Others (5933/08) [2008] ZAWCHC 52; 2008 (6) SA  
    345 (C) para 7. 
69 Mnquma para 94. 
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other’s ‘institutional integrity’.70 In this regard it requires the various departments in 
government to ‘inform one another of, and consult on matters of common interest’.71 
Accordingly, before the provincial executive applies any of the steps in terms of section 139 
(1)(a)-(c), it should inform the municipality by way of a prior notice and allow it to respond 
to the concerns identified in the notice. Only after representations by the municipality have 
been considered can the ‘appropriate step’ be taken in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). The 
‘appropriate step’ taken by the provincial executive should ‘fit the situation’ identified by the 
problems in the notice. The prior notice should: 
• ‘identify the executive obligations in respect of which the municipality is failing; 
• describe the extent of non-fulfilment; 
• indicate the intention of the provincial executive to start a section 139 procedure; 
• invite the council to make written representation; and 
• contain a reasonable time period to make representations relating to the concerns’.72 
4.2 Applying section 139 (1)(a) interventions 
Should the opportunity to make representations not have the effect of adequately addressing 
the concerns relating to the failure of the executive obligation then the provincial executive 
may issue a directive in terms of section 139(1)(a). The directive serves as an instruction to 
the municipality ‘describing the extent of the failure to fulfil the obligations and stating the 
steps which is (sic) required to meet such obligations’.73 The directive is the least intrusive 
intervention in terms of section 139(1) but is important in that it lays the ground for further 
possible interventions. Such interventions however can only arise from the executive 
obligations that are not being fulfilled and which are founded in terms of ‘legislation and the 
Constitution’.74 Hence, the steps outlined in the directive create a legal obligation on the 
municipality which in turn is directly linked to the legal basis for such intervention or 
possible future intervention. Thus, the directive should:  
                                                 
70 S 41(e)(g) 1996 Constitution. 
71 S 41(h)(iii) 1996 Constitution. 
72 Department of Provincial and Local Government Intervening in Provinces and Municipalities- 
    Guidelines for the Application of section 100 and 139 of the Constitution (2007) 18. 
73 S 139(1)(a) 1996 Constitution 
74 S 139(1) 1996 Constitution 
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• ‘state that the provincial executive is acting in terms of section 139(1)(a) of the 
Constitution; 
• identify the executive obligations in respect of which the municipality is failing; 
• respond to the representations made by the municipal council; 
• outline the steps to be taken by the municipal council to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations referred to; 
• afford a reasonable time period for the municipal council to take such steps;  
• instruct the municipal council to report to the provincial executive on the 
implementation of the directive; and 
• state that failure to implement the steps can be followed up by the assumption of 
responsibility in terms of section 139(1)(b)’.75 
Provincial executives however, do not often issue section directives in terms of 139(1)(a) or 
at least they do not feature in the formal documentation of the intergovernmental review.76 
The Mnquma judgement made it clear that the directive is not a precondition for the 
assumption of responsibilities when the High Court stated that interventions in terms of 
section 139(1)(a)-(c) are ‘not a step in a process’.77 This is in contrast to the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of section 100(1) which holds that the directive is a precondition for the 
assumption of responsibility.78 Section 100(1) is the partner provision of section 139(1) and 
regulates the relationship between central and provincial governments. Despite its distinct 
advantages it seems that the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a) is under-utilised as a 
means to remedy the failure at the municipality.  
4.3 Applying section 139(1)(b) interventions 
If the municipality fails to implement the directive, the provincial executive can proceed to 
assume the responsibility for the relevant failed executive obligation. However, before 
assuming responsibility in terms of section 139(1)(b) the municipality should be afforded the 
                                                 
75 Department of Provincial and Local Government Intervening in Provinces and Municipalities-  
    Guidelines for the Application of section 100 and 139 of the Constitution (2007) 19. 
76 South African Local Government The Application of Sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: The  
     Need for Legislation in Terms of Sections 100(3) and 139(8) (2014) 7.  
77 Mnquma para 72. 
78 In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 2 SA 
    97 (CC) para 124 
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opportunity to make representations with regard to the problems identified in the directive. 
The prior notice follows below: 
4.3.1 Prior notice 
Before proceeding to assume responsibility it is incumbent on the provincial executive to 
notify the municipality of its intention to intervene at the municipality and the action to be 
taken to remedy the failure there. The notice should include: 
• ‘an identification of the municipality’s failure to comply with one or more steps of the 
directive; 
• an invitation to the municipality to make representations with regard to its efforts to 
comply with the directive; and 
• a reasonable time period to make the representations’.79 
4.3.2 Assumption of responsibility 
The Mnquma judgement made it clear that the directive does not necessarily have to serve as 
precondition for the assumption of responsibilities in terms of section 139(1)(b) of the 
Constitution.80 Also, should the provincial executive decide to continue with the intervention 
even after the municipal council submitted the representations relating to the prior notice for 
the assumption of responsibilities, then the provincial executive may proceed in terms of 
section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution. Section 139(1)(b) provides that the provincial executive 
may assume responsibility for the failed executive obligation to ‘the extent that it is necessary 
to maintain essential services or meet established minimum standards; prevent the 
municipality from taking unreasonable steps; or maintain economic unity’.81 Hence, the 
provincial executive undertakes to assume responsibility for the relevant executive obligation 
that was not fulfilled in so far as it is allowed to in terms of section 139(b)(i)-(iii). In City of 
Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape Swain J states that the purpose of the intervention 
is ‘remedial and not punitive’.82  
                                                 
79 Department Provincial and Local Government Intervening in Provinces and Municipalities- Guidelines for 
     the Application of section 100 and 139 of the Constitution (2007) 20. 
80 Mnquma para 72. 
81 S 139(1)(b)(i)-(iii) 1996 Constitution. 
82 City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape and Others (5933/08) [2008] ZAWCHC 52; 2008 (6) SA  
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4.3.3 Procedural requirements after assumption of responsibility  
After the assumption of responsibility the Constitution provides that the relevant provincial 
executive must submit a written notice of the intervention to the Cabinet member responsible 
for local government affairs, the provincial legislature and the National Council of Provinces. 
The relevant provincial executives must notify the three organs of state within 14 days of the 
intervention began.83 Should the Minister not approve or disapprove the intervention within 
28 days then the intervention must end.84 According to De Visser and Steytler the Minister is 
not permitted to add any but only subtract aspects related to the intervention.85 In Mnquma it 
was held that the Minister for local government affairs was ‘empowered to terminate any 
form of action taken against the municipality under section 139(1)’.86 Such authority with 
regard to the assumption of responsibility lapses after 28 days have passed.  
Furthermore, the provincial legislature also has to be notified within 14 days after the 
assumption of responsibilities in terms of section 139(1)(b).87 According to De Visser and 
Steytler the notification serves two purposes: oversight by the provincial legislature of the 
provincial executive authority and to facilitate a decision by the NCOP for the approval or 
disapproval of the intervention.88 
In addition to the provincial executive having to submit a written notice to the NCOP within 
14 days of the intervention,89 the Constitution also provides that the NCOP should approve or 
disapprove the intervention within 180 days. Should the NCOP not approve or disapprove 
within the specified time-frame then the intervention should end.90 The purpose of the 
provincial executive having to notify the NCOP is twofold.91 First, the notice serves to 
inform the NCOP that the municipality is faced with serious problems. This is in line with the 
principles of Chapter Three in the Constitution which provides for the organs of government 
                                                                                                                                                        
    345 (C) at para 7. 
83 S 139 (2)(a)(i) Constitution. 
84 S 139 (2)(b)(i) Constitution. 
85 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-24. 
86 Mnquma para 82. 
87 S 139(2)(a)(ii) 1996 Constitution.  
88 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-25. 
89 S 139(2)(a)(ii) 1996 Constitution. 
90 S 139(2)(b)(ii) 1996 Constitution. 
91 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-26. 
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to inform and consult with each other. Secondly, informing the NCOP also serves to hold the 
Minister accountable for the approval or disapproval of the intervention even though such a 
decision cannot be overturned.92 The NCOP may set terms for the approval of the 
interventions but in doing so is only permitted to subtract and not add aspects related to the 
intervention. The NCOP ‘must while the intervention continues, review the intervention 
regularly and may make any appropriate recommendations to the provincial executive’.93 
4.3.4 The position after the assumption of responsibility  
Having assumed responsibility for the failure of the executive obligations, the provincial 
executive emerges as the key decision-maker of the various role players. For instance the 
provincial executive has the discretion to decide on the duration and extent of the 
intervention. The NCOP assumes an oversight role tasked with the responsibility to regularly 
review the intervention and subsequently provide recommendations to the provincial 
executive.  
Both the review and the approval by the NCOP are ‘intergovernmental checks and balances 
aimed at guarding the efficiency and integrity of the intervention processes.94 The NCOP 
assumes the power to regularly review and make recommendations and both the NCOP and 
the Minister assumes the power to set down terms for the intervention. Also, the NCOP may 
make ‘non-binding recommendations to the provincial executive’.95 Hence, it cannot instruct 
the provincial executive what to do but rather what not to do. The roles of the NCOP and 
Minister therefore are to ‘act as a constraint’ which serves to ‘scrutinise the measures taken 
by the provincial executive’.96  
Should the assumption of responsibilities not be appropriate to remedy the failure at the 
municipality the relevant provincial executive has the discretion to invoke section 
139(1)(1)(c) ‘should exceptional circumstances warrant such a step’. The steps to apply 
section 139(1)(c) are outlined below.  
                                                 
92 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-26. 
93 S 139(2)(c) 1996 Constitution. 
94 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-26. 
95 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-26. 
96 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-26. 
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4.4 Applying section 139(1)(c) 
If ‘exceptional circumstances warrant such a step’ the provincial executive can dissolve the 
municipal council in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution. The steps for the 
dissolution of the municipal council are outlined below.  
4.4.1 Prior notice  
In line with the cooperative principles outlined in Chapter Three of the Constitution the 
provincial executive should notify the Council in writing of its intention to dissolve the 
municipal Council. The notice should include: 
• identification of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ in terms of section 139(1)(c) which 
the municipality did not comply with; 
• motivation as to why the dissolution is necessary; 
• an invitation to the municipal council to make written representations with regard to 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’; and 
• a reasonable time period for the making of representations. 
4.4.2 Dissolution of the Council in terms of section 139(1)(c) 
In the event of ‘exceptional circumstances’, section 139(1)(c) provides for ‘dissolving the 
municipal council and appointing an administrator until a newly elected municipal council 
has been declared elected. The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the context of 139(1)(c) 
refers to the situation that is ‘markedly unusual or specially different’ and implies that 
dissolution of the council is the only appropriate step that would achieve the fulfilment of the 
executive obligation.97 In Mnquma the High Court states that there are three important 
aspects that flow from the reading of paragraph (c) of section 139(1). These aspects relate to 
the fact that consideration should have been given to: ‘other forms of intervention which are 
effective and less intrusive’; that there should be a ‘causal connection between the conduct of 
the municipal council and the continued failure to comply with the executive obligation’; and 
the dissolution should serve as a remedy for solving the problem at the municipality.98 
                                                 
97 Mnquma para 81. 
98 Mnquma para 80. 
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In Mnquma Van Zyl J cautioned that careful consideration should be given before provincial 
executives resort to dissolution of the municipal council as it is more intrusive than the other 
forms of intervention. In this regard Murray argues that ‘dissolution ought to be a last resort 
… which is due to the unusual situation forced on the provincial executive in order to 
implement the intervention effectively’.99 Murray argues that ‘upon dissolution of the council 
in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution, the assumption of the legislative functions 
of the council seems to be a ‘necessary condition’ and as such the provincial executive may 
assume the legislative powers.100 She further argues that the council in this case not only 
loses its authority but that the councillors also lose their rights and obligations as members of 
the council. Thus a new council must be elected, but until such time an administrator who 
assumes the duties of the council should be appointed. The question then arises of whether 
dissolution in terms of section 139(1)(c), which is based on the non-fulfilment of an 
executive obligation, encroaches on both the executive and legislative functions of the 
council? Also, should the new administrator who assumes the power of the council assume 
both the executive and legislative functions of the council? According to De Visser & 
Steytler the administrator may ‘exercise the legislative and executive powers that are 
necessary to ensure the continuation of service delivery and municipal governance’.101 
4.4.3 Procedural requirements for the dissolution  
Should the provincial executive dissolve the municipality the provincial executive must 
inform the municipality in writing of such a decision. In addition, it also has to immediately 
notify the Minister responsible for Local Government, the relevant provincial legislature as 
well as the NCOP of the decision.102 The dissolution becomes effective 14 days after the 
NCOP received the notice.103 However, should the Cabinet member or the NCOP disapprove 
                                                 
99 Hofmann-Wanderer Y & Murray Suspension and Dissolution of Municipal Councils under section 139 of the 
     Constitution (2007) 145. 
100 Hofmann-Wanderer Y & Murray Suspension and Dissolution of Municipal Councils under section 139 of the  
      Constitution (2007) 142. 
101 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-29. 
102 S 139(3)(a)(I)(ii) 1996 Constitution. 
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of the dissolution or not approve within 28 or 180 days respectively then the intervention is 
invalid.104  
4.4.4 After the dissolution 
After the dissolution, the MEC appoints an administrator who ensures the functionality of the 
municipality and the provision of services until a new council is declared elected. According 
to De Visser and Steytler the actions of the administrator are ‘remedial in nature in 
anticipation of a new council’.105  
5 Ending the intervention 
The provincial executive should end the particular intervention when the problems have been 
solved by the municipality. The intervention in terms of section 139(1)(b) ends when the 
municipality is able to: maintain the essential services or meet the minimum established 
standard of services; not prejudice the interests of other municipalities; and maintain 
economic unity. Accordingly, the recovery plan which was adopted when the provincial 
executive intervened in terms of section 139(1)(b) ceases as and when the municipality is 
able to implement the aforementioned plan by itself or when the objectives set out in the plan 
have been met. The provincial executive ends the intervention in terms of section 139(1)(c) 
when the newly elected council takes control of the executive and legislative functions of the 
municipality. The appointment of the administrator thus ends when the municipal council 
once again takes control of the municipality. Upon ending the intervention all interested 
parties such as the municipality, Minister of Finance, Minister of Local Government, any 
creditors with pending litigation, the provincial legislature as well as organised local 
government have to be informed by the MEC for Finance of the termination of the 
intervention. 
6 Summary 
The purpose of interventions in terms of sections 139(1) is to enable provincial executives to 
put the affected municipality in a position to fulfil the failed executive obligation. These 
interventions are circumscribed by rules and principles which are enshrined in the 
                                                 
104 S 139(3)(b) 1996 Constitution. 
105 De Visser J & Steytler N Local Government Law of South Africa 2 ed (2012) 15-29. 
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Constitution and legislation. Should these rules and principles not be adhered to then the 
intervention may be terminated by the courts, the Minister or the NCOP. Complying with the 
requirements for the use of interventions is therefore not only necessary to avoid suspension 
of the intervention but also essential for the speedy remedy of the failed executive obligation.  
In the following chapter the data acquired for the use of interventions in terms of section 139 
(1)(a)-(c) from the beginning of 2009 until March 2014 will be presented. The data will assist 
in determining whether or not the relevant provincial executives followed the requirements 
necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1). In this way the answers 
ultimately determine the role of provinces for the use of interventions in terms of section 139 
(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution. 
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Chapter Three 
The Compliance of Section 139(1) Interventions 
1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the presentation of data related to the compliance for interventions in 
terms of section 139(1). The data for these interventions dates from January 1998 until March 
2014. In this chapter eight questions are posed with reference to how provincial executives 
applied the steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the 
Constitution. These questions are posed in response to the uncertainty around the application 
of the steps necessary for the use of interventions (see Chapter Two, sections 2.1 and 2.2). In 
order to assess the impact of these uncertainties on the steps necessary for compliance with 
interventions in terms of section 139 (1), this chapter looks at the notices submitted by 
provincial executives to the Minister and the NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i)-(ii) for 
the last five years. The data acquired from these notices are complemented by the progress 
reports by the NCOP and COGTA for aforementioned interventions. Discussion documents 
from COGTA and SALGA are also used for the categorisation of the nature of the problems 
and breakdown of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. The data 
acquired from these reports, notices and discussion documents are used to answer the eight 
questions related to the requirements for compliance of interventions in terms of section 
139(1)(a)-(c). Ultimately, the data allows an assessment to be made of the role of provinces 
in the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. 
The data mentioned above is categorised in a manner that follows the steps necessary for the 
use of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c). The data captured in Tables 3 and 4 
includes: identifying the nature of the problems at the municipality; the legal basis for the 
intervention; the steps taken to remedy the problems; dates of prior notices to the 
municipality; dates of interventions; dates of notices informing the Minister and NCOP of the 
intervention; dates of dis/approvals by the Minister and NCOP; and dates of the termination 
of the interventions. The information acquired from abovementioned data is used to answer 
the questions related to the steps necessary for complying with interventions in terms of 
section 139 (1) of the Constitution. 
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The outcome of these answers determine whether the steps applied by the relevant provincial 
executives comply with the requirements as provided in the Constitution for the use of the 
particular interventions. Also, based on the answers the researcher is able to assess which of 
the procedural steps have proven to be difficult to apply and which not, as well as to ascertain 
if there were instances where the use of interventions in terms of section 139 (1) was applied 
outside of what is constitutionally permitted. Before categorising the data in accordance with 
the problems identified at the municipality, the provincial breakdown for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139 is provided. 
2. Provincial breakdown of section 139 interventions, 1998–2014 
From January 1998 till March 2014 there have been 72 interventions undertaken by provinces 
in terms of sections 139, which include sections 139(1), (4) and (5) in Table 1 below. This 
amount represents an average of five interventions per annum. During this period 18 
interventions were undertaken in KwaZulu-Natal followed closely by the North West with 15 
interventions in terms of section 139. The Free State, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga all 
undertook 10 interventions during this period, with the other provinces, namely, Western 
Cape (5), Northern Cape (2), Gauteng (1) and Limpopo (1), recording five or less. The 
provincial breakdown of these interventions from 1998 until March 2014 is presented in 
Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Provincial Breakdown of Section 139 Interventions (1998 – 2014) 
Province No. of Interventions 
North West 15  
Free State 10 
Gauteng 1 
Northern Cape 2 
Eastern Cape 10  
Mpumalanga 10  
KwaZulu-Natal 18 
Western Cape 5  
Limpopo 1 
Total 72 
 SALGA:  - The Application of Sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: March 2014  
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2.1 Section 139 interventions from January 2009 till March 2014 
Between January 2009 and March 2014 KwaZulu-Natal again recorded the highest number of 
interventions, 12, followed by North-West with nine and Mpumalanga with seven 
interventions in terms of section 139(1). Eastern Cape undertook five interventions while 
Free State recorded four interventions in terms of section 139(1). The Western Cape 
undertook three interventions of which two were undertaken in terms of section 139(4) and 
the other one in terms of section 139(1). Lastly Limpopo recorded only one intervention in 
terms of section 139(1) while Gauteng’s only intervention was undertaken in terms of section 
139(5). The interventions undertaken by provinces in terms of section 139(1), (4) and (5) of 
the Constitution for the last five years amount to 42. This represents an average of more than 
eight interventions per annum from 2009 until 2014, and shows an increase of three 
interventions per annum against the average of five between 1998 and 2014. The provincial 
breakdown of these interventions is presented in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Section 139 interventions from (2009–2014) 
Province Section  
139 (1) 
Section 
139 (4)  
Section 
139 (5) 
Total 
North West 9    
Free State 4    
Gauteng   1  
Northern Cape 0    
Eastern Cape 5    
Mpumalanga 7    
KwaZulu-Natal 12    
Western Cape 1 2   
Limpopo 1    
Total  39 2 1 42 
SALGA: The Application of Sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: March 2014   
2.2 Steps necessary for the use of interventions 
The Constitution provides that provinces have to apply various steps for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. These steps include: identifying 
the problems; the legal basis for the intervention; notices to the Minister and NCOP; and 
dis/approvals by Minister and NCOP. The various steps are discussed below. 
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2.2.1 Identifying the nature of the problem 
In the notices by the relevant provincial executives to the Minister and NCOP in terms of 
section 139(2)(a)(i)-ii), the nature of the failures at the municipality are defined. These 
problems are grouped into the following broad categories namely, governance, financial and 
service delivery. These categories are also adopted in the discussion documents by COGTA 
and SALGA.106 The categories in which the problems are grouped are outlined below. 
(i) Governance 
Governance problems range from political in-fighting to political mismanagement and 
include instances of Council’s inability to perform as required by legislation. For example, in 
the case of the Umvoti municipality, persistent political in-fighting culminated in the 
unlawful election of office-bearers and the unlawful election of a new Speaker.107 This was 
also the case at the Mnquma municipality where the two factions in the Council were in 
opposition to each other, with the one faction being led by the Executive Mayor and the other 
by the Speaker and the Chief Whip.108 Also, in the case of Swellendam Municipality the 
quorum for decision-making was frustrated on numerous occasions, leading to the approval 
of the IDP, the tabling of the draft annual budget and the approval of the annual budget for 
2012/13 not meeting the prescribed time-frames.109 The above examples have resulted in the 
non-performance of top management and conflicts between top management and councillors 
resulting in a state of dysfunctionality at the municipalities.  
However, the challenge with linking governance problems to an executive obligation is that 
these problems at times manifest themselves through a range of administrative or financial 
difficulties rather than difficulties of governance. For instance, problems pertaining to the 
intervention at the Sundays River Local and the Kou Kamma Municipalities are identified in 
                                                 
106 South African Local Government The Application of sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution: The need for  
      Legislation in terms of sections 100 (3) and 139 (8) (2014) 6.  
107 Provincial Government of KwaZulu Natal: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
     2013/07/18. 
108 Provincial Government of Eastern Cape: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(b) of the Constitution.  
     2013/04/03.  
109 Provincial Government of Western Cape: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
     2013/08/29.  
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the notice to the Minister and NCOP as financial problems.110 However these problems are 
directly attributed to poor governance as a result of political in-fighting between factions. 
Common threads identified in municipalities experiencing problems of a governance nature 
are: incapacity to correct institutional problems; no improvement in financial controls; non-
compliance with legislation; audit disclaimers from the auditor general; and dysfunctional 
municipal councils. In most instances, provinces do not learn of governance problems 
through monitoring mechanisms but rather through political channels, word-of-mouth or by 
the lack of decision-making from the municipality. These governance problems have proved 
to be one of the most common cause for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1). 
(ii) Financial and administrative dysfunctions  
Besides governance, financial non-viability is quite often one of the difficulties experienced 
by municipalities in distress. This has often been due to administrative failures to effectively 
manage the financial situation at the municipality. The result is usually that the municipality 
does not raise sufficient revenue due to the administrative incapacity leading to weak billing 
systems, lack of credit control and poor tariff policies. This was the case at the Ugu, Uthukela 
and Umzunyathi municipalities, which resulted in these municipalities not being able to pay 
for services rendered by the entity Uthukela Water. In most instances, financial triggers have 
been picked up through established monitoring mechanisms such as annual Audit and 
National Treasury reports. 
(iii) Service delivery 
Sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution clearly set out the service delivery obligations of 
municipalities whereas Parts B of Schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution stipulate the 
functional areas of municipalities. The municipalities are usually not able to keep up with the 
high demand for these services leading to breakdowns of systems or services not rendered. 
Problem areas related to services may include little or no spending on repairs and 
maintenance. For example, at the Uthukela District Municipality only 2% of the budget was 
for repairs and maintenance while the norm is 8%-10%, resulting in the collapse of the 
                                                 
110 Provincial Government of Eastern Cape: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
      2014/04/03.  
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existing water infrastructure.111 Other problems related to service delivery include: lack of 
monitoring systems; poor community relations; no reporting on the progress of IDP; and no 
consequences for maladministration and mismanagement. In the cases of the Madibeng, 
Moses Kotane, Ngaka and Tswaing, the failure by the leadership to take responsibility for the 
irregularities at the municipality resulted in service delivery protests.112 In Madibeng, the 
protests resulted in the deaths of four members of the Madibeng community and the Council 
was subsequently changed.113 However, lack of effective monitoring mechanisms has 
resulted in management rarely being held accountable for poorly managed service delivery or 
for community dissatisfaction with services. These three broad categories will be used for 
purposes of identifying the failure at the municipality.  
2.2.2 Legal basis for the intervention 
Section 139(1) of the Constitution provides that the provincial executive may intervene in the 
event of the municipality failing to fulfil an executive obligation. The failure of the executive 
obligation must however be determined with reference to the Constitution or legislation 
which then becomes the legal basis for the use of the intervention in terms of section 139(1). 
In doing so, provincial executives tend to link the failures of the municipality to obligations 
that are ‘aimed at the effective performance of local government of its executive obligations 
rather than to the executive obligation itself’.114 In Mnquma Van Zyl J states that these 
obligations or duties which tend to be confused with the executive obligations are inter alia 
contained in legislation such as the Municipal Structures Act and Municipal Systems Act.115  
2.2.3 Applying the Appropriate Step 
Having identified the nature of the problem, the relevant provincial executive is then tasked 
to consider the appropriate mode of intervention to remedy the problems at the 
municipality.116 The Constitution provides that the appropriate step in terms of section 139(1) 
                                                 
111 Provincial Government of KwaZulu Natal: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(a) of the Constitution.  
     2013/05/07. 
112 Provincial Government of KwaZulu Natal: Notice in terms of section 139(2) (a) of the Constitution.  
     2013/05/07. 
113 Provincial Government of North West: Notice in terms of section 139(2)(a) of the Constitution. 2010/03/10 
114 Mnquma para 65 (discussed in 2.1.1). 
115 Mnquma para 65. 
116 S 139(1)(a)-(c) 1996 Constitution. 
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should be considered ‘to fit the situation’ at the municipality. What is apparent in Table 3 
below is that out of the 39 interventions from January 2009 to March 2014, 37 were 
undertaken in terms of section 139(1)(b).Very few of these interventions were undertaken in 
terms of section 139(1)(a) or (c). Of the outstanding two interventions, one was undertaken in 
terms of section 139(1)(a) and the other in terms of section 139(1)(c). The provincial 
breakdown of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) are shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Provincial breakdown of interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) (2009 – 
2014) 
Name of 
Municipality  
Nature of Problem Legal Basis for 
Intervention 
Appropriate 
Step 
North West: 9 Interventions 
1. Ngaka  Governance, financial and 
administrative dysfunctionality 
Ss 4, 29 Structures Act, 
S 23 LRA 
139(1)(b) 
2. Moses Kotane Governance, financial and 
administrative dysfunctionality 
S 4 Structures Act 139(1)(b) 
3. Tswaing Local 
Municipality  
Governance, financial and 
administrative dysfunctionality. 
S 57 Management, S 71 
MFMA, S 4 Structures Act 
139(1)(b) 
4. Madibeng Local 
Municipality 
Governance, financial and 
administrative dysfunctionality. 
S 4 Structures Act 139(1)(b) 
5. Mafikeng Local 
Municipality  
Governance, Financial and 
administrative, Service delivery  
S 57 Performance 
Management Act 
Non-compliance with 
MFMA and Treasury 
regulations 
139(1)(b) 
6. Maquassi Hills LM 
(Kenneth Kaunda 
District) 
Financial Administration, 
Governance and Service Delivery  
Ss 51, 54A, 56 Systems Act 139(1)(b) 
7. Matlosana Local 
Municipality  
Governance, Financial 
Administration 
Ss51, 54A, 56 (MSA 2000) 139(1)(b) 
8. Ditsobotla Local 
Municipality  
Financial Administration, 
Governance and Service delivery 
Ss 51, 54A, 56 Systems Act, 
S 139(1)(b) Constitution 
139(1)(b) 
9. Madibeng  Financial Administration, 
Governance and Service delivery 
Withdrawn/disapproval by 
Minister 
139(1)(b) 
Free State: 4 Interventions 
1. Thabo 
Mafutsayane 
Governance, and Financial 
Administration 
Ss 39, 28, 32 Systems Act,  
Ss 71, 46 MFMA 
139(1)(b) 
 
2. MatlosanaLocal 
Municipality  
Governance and Financial 
Administration 
Ss 46, 39, 28, 29 Systems 
Act 
139(1)(b) 
3. Naledi Local 
Municipality 
(Motheo District) 
Governance Council 
Dysfunctionality, Financial 
administration. 
Ss 154, 46, 71 Systems Act 139(1)(c) 
4. Masilonyana Local 
Municipality  
Governance and Financial 
Administration 
Ss 46, 39,71 Systems Act, 
PMS Framework  
139(1)(b) 
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Eastern Cape: 5 Interventions 
 
1. Mnquma Local 
Municipality 
(Amathole District) 
Governance (Dysfunctional 
Council) 
Ss 41(3), 152(1), 21 of the 
Constitution, Ss4(2)(a, b, d, 
f) Systems Act, Ss 21, 32, 
73, 74, 99, 111, 112, 115, 
131, 165, 172 MFMA  
139(1)(c) 
2. Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality 
Governance, Financial 
managemnet 
uncertain 139(1)(b) 
3. Kou-Kamma Local 
Municipality  
Governance, Financial 
management 
S 154 Constitution, in Ss 
133, 127 MFMA 
139(1)(b) 
4. Sunday’s River 
Valley Local 
Municipality (Cacadu 
District) 
Financial (Administration ), 
Governance  
uncertain 139(1)(b) 
5. Mnquma Local 
Municipality  
Governance S 36(5), S 29(1) Structures 
Act, Ss 52 55, 56, 59, 66(1), 
67(4) , 70 Systems Act, Ss 
60, 66, 68 72 MFMA 
139(1)(b) 
Mpumalanga: 7 Interventions  
1. PixleykaSeme 
(Gert Sibande 
District) 
Governance and financial controls S 55 Systems Act, S 56 
Structures Act 
139(1)(b) 
2. Mkhondo Local 
Municipality  
Governance and financial 
dysfunctionality 
S 57 Manager’s position 139(1)(b) 
3. Lekwa Local 
Municipality  
Governance and financial 
dysfunctionality 
S 56 Structures Act, S 55 
Systems Act 
139(1)(b) 
4. ThabaChweu 
Local Municipality 
(Ehlanzeni District) 
Financial (Administrative 
Management) 
S 55 Systems Act 
 
139(1)(b 
5. Thembisile Hani 
(Nkangala District) 
Financial (Administrative) and 
Governance) 
uncertain 139(1)(b) 
6. Emalahleni Local 
Municipality 
(Nkangala District) 
Governance, Service delivery and 
Financial (Administration) 
S 55 Systems Act, 
S 56 (2) Structures Act 
139(1)(b) 
7. Bushbuckridge 
Local Municipality 
(Ehlanzeni District) 
Service delivery; and Financial 
(Administration) 
S 55 Systems Act 
S 56(2) Structures Act  
139(1)(b) 
KwaZulu-Natal: 12 Interventions 
1. Umhlabuyalingana 
Local Municipality 
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
Ss 51, 52 Systems Act S 152 
Constitution, S 131, 136, 
138 MFMA 
139(1)(b) 
2. Indaka Local 
Municipality 
(Uthukela District) 
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
S 51 Systems Act, S 152 
Constitution 
Ss 121, 129 MFMA  
139(1)(b) 
3. Okhahlamba Local 
Municipality 
Governance and Financial 
Administration 
S 51 Systems Act 
S 152 Constitution, Ss136, 
139(1)(b) 
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(Uthukela District) 121, 129, 165, 166 MFMA 
4. Umsunduzi Local 
Municipality  
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
Ss29, 71, 111, 134 MFMA, 
S 28 Systems Act 
139(1)(b) 
5. Mtubatuba Local 
Municipality 
(Umkha-nyakude 
District) 
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
Ss 51, 52 Systems Act 
 
139(1)(b) 
6. Imbabazane Local 
Municipality 
(Uthukela District) 
Governance (Political party 
conflicts).  
S 152 of the Constitution 
S 51, 73 Systems Act 
139(1)(b) 
7. Abaqulusi Local 
Municipality  
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
Ss 64(2)(g), 121 MFMA, Ss 
46(1)(b-c), 54 Systems Act 
139(1)(b 
8. Umzinyathi 
District Municipality 
Financial (Administration) Ss 121(2), 71, 142, 145, 147, 
152, 137, 141, 141(3) 
MFMA  
136(2) MFMA) 
139(1)(b) 
9. Uthukela District 
Municipality 
Financial (Administration) and 
Governance 
Ss 71, 121, 136(2), 141, 142, 
145, 147(1), 137 MFMA 
136(2) MFMA  
139(1)(b) 
10. Ugu District 
Municipality 
Financial (Administration) and 
Governance 
Ss 131(2)(a), 71, 136(2), 
141, 141(3), 142, 145 
MFMA S 152 Constitution 
136(2) MFMA  
139(1)(b) 
11. Umvoti Local 
Municipality  
Governance Ss 51, 152 of the 
Constitution 
139(1)(b) 
12. Indaka Local 
Municipality  
Financial (Administration) and 
Governance 
S 51 Systems Act, S 152 of 
the Constitution, Ss 121, 129 
MFMA 
139(1)(a) 
Western Cape: 1 Intervention 
1.Swellendam local 
Municipality 
Governance and Financial 
(Administration) 
Ss 60, S54 A (2) Systems 
Act, 
 S 60 MFMA 
139(1)(b) 
Limpopo: 1 Intervention 
1. Mogalakwena Governance and Financial  S 139(1)(b) S 152 
Constitution 
139(1)(b) 
Data retrieved from NCOP and COGTA notices and progress reports (2009–2014) 
2.2.4 Notices  
Section 41(h)(iii) of the Constitution provides that the various organs of government consult 
and inform each other on matters of common interest. In this regard, the prior notice to the 
relevant parties not only serves to provide the municipality the opportunity to respond to the 
concerns outlined in the notice but also to inform the parties of the intended actions as well as 
actions taken by the provincial executive. The notices to the Minister and the NCOP in terms 
of section 139(2)(a)(i)-(ii) however have to be served within specific time-frames (14 days). 
The time-frames also apply to the notices for the approvals or disapprovals by the Minister 
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(28 days)  in terms of section 139(2)(b)(i) and NCOP (180 days) in terms of section 
139(2)(b)(ii) after the intervention began. For purposes of this study the dates for the time-
frames pertaining to the dis/approvals by the Minister and NCOP in terms of section 139 (2) 
(b) (i-ii) are measured against calendar days of the year. The shorter period of 14 days period 
within which the provincial executives have to submit written notices to the Minister and the 
NCOP in terms of section (2) (a) (i-ii) are measured against working days. Resorting to this 
measure would make provision for instances where interventions were signed by the relevant 
parties near or before weekends but the intervention process could effectively only 
commence on the Monday or at times even later in the corresponding week. In these 
instances, the measuring of these dates in the same way as those measured for calendar days, 
would not only result in such dates (relating to when the intervention process begins and 
ends) not only reflecting the incorrect dates for such processes but could also result in the 
already high figures for non-compliance in terms of section 139 (2)(a)(i-ii) being much 
higher than presently stated.            
Table 4 overleaf refers to the dates of prior notices; dates on which the interventions began; 
dates of notices to the Minister and NCOP; dates of inspection; dates on which the Minister 
and NCOP approved or disapproved the intervention; and termination dates of the 
intervention. 
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Name of Municipality  Date of 
Prior notice 
Date of 
intervention 
Date of 
notice to 
Minister 
 
Date of 
notice to 
NCOP  
Date of 
approval by 
Minister 
Date of 
inspection 
in loco  
Date of 
approval by 
the NCOP  
Date of  
termination 
of  
intervention 
 
 
Pixley ka Seme 
 
 2009/02/26 2009/02/27 2009/02/29 2009/02/27 Uncertain Uncertain 2010/10/19 
Mquma 2009/ 
02/27 
2009/04/08 2009/04/16 2009/04/16 Uncertain Uncertain Interdict Intervention 
invalid 
Kou Kamma  2009/04/ Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Alfred Nzo 
 
 2009/04/ Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain 31 Oct 2009 
NgakaModoriMolema 
 
 2009/07/01 2009/07/09 2009/07/09 2009/07/10 2009/11/13 2009/11/17 2010/10/06 
Mkhondo Local  
 
 2009/07/14 Uncertain 2009/07/14 Uncertain 2009/11/12 2009/11/17 2010/Dec 
ThabaChweu Local 
 
 2009/10/26 2009/10/27 2009/10/27 Uncertain No No 2010/Dec 
Lekwa Local  
 
 2009/10/26 Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain 
Thabo Mofutsanyane  
 
 2009/11/04 2009/11/08 2009/12/03 2009/11/20 2010/02/24 2010/03/25 2010/11/23 
Indaka Local  
 
 2009/11/24 Uncertain 2010/01/05 Uncertain 2010/03/18 2010/05/20 2013/12/04 
Okhahlamba Local   2009/11/24 2009/12/10 2010/01/05 Uncertain 2010/03-19/ 2010/05/20 2012/06/30 
 
Umhlabuyalingana 
 
 2009/11/24 2009/12/10 2010/01/11 Uncertain 2010/03/17 2010/05/20 2011/06/30 
Nala Local   2009/12/03 2009/12/08 2010/01/11 Uncertain 2010/02/25 2010/03/25 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
 
Table 4: Dates pertaining to the various steps necessary for use of the interventions  
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Masilonyana Local   2009/12/08 2009/12/08 2009/12/08 Uncertain 2010/05/14 2010/05/21 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Sundays River Valley   2010/02/10 2010/02/11 2010/02/16 Uncertain 2010/05/25 2010/06/04 2011/12/31 
 
Madibeng Local   2010/03/10 2010/03/17 2010/03/18 2010/03/18 2010/05/13 2010/05/21 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Moses Kotane Local  2010/03/10 2010/03/17 2010/03/18 2010/03/18 2010/05/26 2010/06/04 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Tswaing Local   2010/03/10 2010/03/17 2010/03/18 2010/03/18 2010/05/11 2010/05/21 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Msunduzi Local  
 
 2010/10/06 2010/10/21 2010/10/22 Uncertain 2010/11/09 2010/11/24 2011/12/31 
Thembisile Hani  
 
 2010/04/16 2010/04/29 2010/04/29 Uncertain 2010/05/27 2010/06/04 No 
Naledi Local   2010/05/05 2010/05/05 2010/05/07 2010/05/06 2010/05/14 2010/05/20 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Mafikeng Local   2010/07/01 Uncertain 2010/07/21 Uncertain 2010/09/14 2010/10/26 Lapsed 18 
May 2011 
Swellendam Local 
 
 2012/08/29 2012/09/17 2012/09/19 2012/09/17 NA NA 2012/10/15 
Mtubatuba Local 
 
 2012/09/19 2012/10/01 2012/10/01 2012/11/04 2013/03/6-8 2013/05/30 No /current 
Imbabazane Local 
 
 2013/01/23 2013/01/23 2013/01/25 2013/03/05 2013/03/6-8 2013/05/30 No /current 
Abaqulusi Local 
 
 2013/03/20 2013/03/20 2013/03/25 Uncertain 2013/08/16 2013/09/12 Uncertain 
Bushbuckridge  
 
 2013/04/17 2013/04/18 2013/04/22 2013/05/25 2013/08/13 2013/09/12 No /current 
Emalahleni Local   2013/04/17 2013/04/18 2013/04/22  2013/08/14 2013/09/12 No /current 
 
Matlosana Local  2013/04/01 2013/05/14 2013/05/19 2013/05/25 2013/08/21 2013/09/12 Withdrawn 
Nov2013 
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Maquassi Hills  
 
 2013/04/01 2013/04/17 2013/04/19 2013/05/25 2013/08/21 2013/09/12 2014/06/03 
Ditsobotla Local 
 
 2013/04/01 2013/04/17 2013/04/19 2013/05/25 2013/08/20 2013/09/12 No/current 
Umzinyathi District  2013/03/20 2013/05/07 2013/07/17 2013/06/21  Uncertain Uncertain No /current 
 
Uthukela District 
 
 2013/03/20 2013/05/07 2013/05/10 2013/07/05 Uncertain Uncertain  No /current 
Ugu District 
 
 2013/04/17 2013/05/07 2013/07/17 2013/06/05 Uncertain Uncertain No /current 
Mnquma Local 2013/01/31 2013/03/19 Notice 4 
months late 
2013/04/03 Min- no sign  2013/08/27 2013/09/12 No /current 
Umvoti Local   2013/07/17 2013/07/18 2013/07/25 Min- no sign 2013/08/15 2013/09/12 No /current 
Indaka Local 
 
 2013/12/04 Uncertain 2014/04/16 Uncertain No Yet No Yet Uncertain 
Madibeng Local   2014/02/05 2014/02/07 2014/02/10 Disapproved Disapproved 2014/07/31  D on 
2014/3/7 
Mogalakwena Local  2014/03/12 2014/03/17 2014/03/26 2014/05/20 Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain 
 
 
Data retrieved from NCOP and COGTA notices and progress reports (2009 – 2014). Key: NA – not applicable; D - Disapproved
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3 Compliance with section 139(1)  
The questions which are answered in this chapter serve to verify if the use of interventions by 
provincial executives in terms of section 139(1)(a)-(c) complied with the requirements laid 
down in the Constitution. These answers are derived from the notices to the Minister and 
NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i)(-ii) as well as the progress reports from COGTA and 
NCOP which relate to aforementioned interventions for the last five years. Each question is 
answered with a ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘uncertain’. A ‘yes’ answer indicates that the relevant 
provincial executive complied with the requirement pertaining to the particular question, 
whereas a ‘no’ answer indicates that it did not. Should any of the notices or reports not be 
available to determine an answer or the dates specified in the notices or reports are illegible 
or omitted then the answer to such questions is ‘uncertain’. The questions are stated below.  
(i) Did the provincial executive make use of the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a)?  
The directive is the least intrusive measure in terms of section 139(1)(a) as it does not 
infringe on the functions of the municipality but merely instructs the municipality what to do 
in order to remedy the problems. This is in line with the ‘constitutional imperative that the 
integrity of local government should be respected’.1 The question therefore arises whether or 
not the municipality made use of the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a) of the 
Constitution.  
(ii) Was a prior notice issued before the section 139(1)(a), (b) or (c) interventions?  
Having identified the problems at the municipality the Constitution provides that the 
provincial executive should inform all parties of the prospect of the intervention in terms of 
section 139(1) and afford the municipality the opportunity to make representations with 
regard to the problems stated in the notice. The question relates to whether the municipality 
was issued with prior notice to make representations with regard to the problems identified in 
the notice which is line with the audi alterem partem rule in our law. 
(iii) Were notices submitted to the Minister and NCOP within stipulated time-frames? 
Chapter Three of the Constitution requires all organs of government to consult and inform 
each other on matters of common interest (discussed in 2.2.1). The Constitution sets specific 
                                                 
1 Mnquma para 6. 
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time-frames for the provincial executive to forward the notices containing the relevant 
information to the relevant parties. The question is therefore whether these notices were 
submitted within the 14 day time-frames to the Minister and the NCOP in terms of section 
1399(a)(i)-(ii) of the Constitution. 
(iv) Is the failure identified in the notice to the Minister and NCOP?  
In Mnquma, Van Zyl J stated that the ‘first enquiry by the provincial executive is to identify 
the failure of the municipality’2 with reference to the Constitution or legislation. Hence, the 
study examines whether the failure at the municipality (defined as the nature of the problems) 
is outlined in the aforementioned notices to the Minister and NCOP. 
(v) Does the failure relate to a legislative obligation that has been breached?  
As mentioned in (iv) above the failures identified in the notice must be determined with 
reference to the Constitution or legislation. The question then arises if the relevant provincial 
executive identifies the legal basis for the intervention in terms of section 139(1)(a), (b) or 
(c).  
(vi) Does the failure in the notice relate to an ‘executive obligation’ as defined in 
Mnquma?  
Van Zyl J in Mnquma states that the enquiry to address the failure should not only identify 
the problems at the municipality but such problems should ‘relate to the failure to fulfil an 
executive obligation’. The question then arises whether the problems identified in the notices 
do relate to an ‘executive obligation’ as defined in Mnquma.  
(vii) Did the Minister and NCOP dis/approve the intervention within the specified time-
frame?  
Section 139(2)(b)(i)-(ii) spells out the time-frames in which the Minister and the NCOP have 
to approve or disapprove the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1). The question that 
comes to the fore is whether the intervention was approved or not within the time-frames by 
the Minister (28 days) and NCOP (180 days) as stipulated in the Constitution.  
(viii) Did the provincial executive request an extension for the intervention?  
                                                 
2 Mquma para 87. 
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The period for the intervention in the notice to the Minister and NCOP is usually confined to 
six months to remedy the situation at the municipality. The question is whether the relevant 
provincial executives were able to address the failures at the municipality within the initial 
period mentioned in the notices to the relevant parties or if extension periods were requested  
in order to remedy the failed obligation. 
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Table 5 which follows below provides an overview of the answers to the eight questions. This is followed by the Tables 6-13 which project the 
percentages and totals of the answers to the eight questions. 
Table 5: Overview of answers to the eight questions 
Name of Municipality / 
Department 
Did the 
provincial 
executive 
make use 
of 
directive? 
Was prior 
notice 
Issued? 
Were notices 
submitted 
within 
specified 
timeframe to 
Min/NCOP? 
Is the 
failure 
identified 
in notices 
to Min/ 
NCOP? 
Does the 
failure relate 
to a 
legislative 
obligation 
that has been 
breached? 
Does the 
failure 
relate to an 
executive 
obligation?  
Did the 
Min/NCOP 
dis/ approve 
intervention 
within 
timeframe. 
Min/NCOP? 
Did the 
provincial 
executive 
request  
extension for 
intervention? 
 
PixleykaSeme No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No 
Mquma No Yes Yes/Yes  Yes Yes No Unc/Unc No 
Kou Kamma No No Unc/Unc Yes Yes No Unc/Unc Unc 
Alfred Nzo Unc Unc Unc//Unc Unc Unc Unc Unc/Unc Unc 
Ngaka No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes 
Mkhondo Local  Unc Unc Unc/Unc Yes Yes No Unc/Yes No 
ThabaChweu Local No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Unc No 
Lekwa Local  Unc No Unc/Unc Yes Yes No Unc/Unc No 
Thabo Mofutsanyane  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No 
Indaka Local  No No Unc/No  Yes Yes No Unc/Yes Yes 
Okhahlamba No No No /No  Yes Yes No Unc/Yes Yes 
Umhlabuyalingana No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Yes  No 
Nala Local  No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Unc/Yes No 
Masilonyana Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Yes No 
Sundays River  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Yes No 
Madibeng Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No 
Moses Kotane No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No 
Tswaing Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No 
Msunduzi Local  No No No /No Yes  Yes No Unc/Yes Yes 
Thembisile Hani  No No Yes/Yes Yes No No Unc/Yes Yes 
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Naledi Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No 
Mafikeng Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes Unc/Yes  No 
Swellendam Local  No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No 
Mtubatuba Local No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No  No/No Yes 
Imbabazane Local No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No  No/Yes No 
Abaqulusi Local No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Yes Yes 
Bushbuckridge  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No  No/Yes No 
Emalahleni Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No No /Yes No 
Matlosana Local No No No /No  Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No 
Maquassi Hills  No No No/No Yes Yes Yes  No /Yes No 
Ditsobotla Local No No No /No  Yes Yes Yes  No /Yes No 
Umzinyathi Yes Yes No /No Yes Yes Yes   No /Unc No 
Uthukela District No No No /No Yes Yes Yes  No/Unc No 
Ugu District No No No /No Yes Yes No Yes/Unc No 
Mnquma Local Yes Yes No /Yes Yes Yes No No /Yes No 
Umvoti Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes Yes  No /Yes Yes 
Indaka Yes No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Unc/Unc No 
Madibeng Local  No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No 
Mogalakwena No No Yes/Yes Yes Yes No No/Unc No 
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4 Tally of the answers 
In this section the answers to the eight questions serve to assess whether the steps necessary 
for interventions in terms of section 139 (1) of the Constitution have been followed. The 
answers are tallied in three categories – ‘yes’,’ no’ and ‘uncertain’ – and outlined below.  
 
 
Question 1: Did the provincial executive make use of the directive? 
Yes                  No                   Uncertain          Total 
3 (8%)                 33 (84%)       3 (8%)           39 (100%) 
      
 
Table 6: Did the provincial executive make use of the directive?  
 
 
 
 
 
Were the dis/approvals submitted within specified time-frame? 
Yes  No  Uncertain Total 
Min/NCOP Min/NCOP Min/NCOP 
 
 
 
 
Data collated for Question 1 indicates that out of the 39 interventions, 8% (3) made use of the 
directive, 84% (33) did not, while for 8% (3) of the interventions the required documentation 
was not available to determine an answer.  
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Question 2: Was a prior notice issued before the Section 139(1)(a), (b) or (c) intervention? 
Yes             No              Uncertain            Total 
3 (8%)            34 (87%)          2 (5%)                 39 (100%)  
 
Table 7: Was a prior notice issued before the section 139 (1) (a) – (c) intervention?  
 
Table 10b: Were notices submitted within stipulated time-frames? (NCOP) 3 32 4 39 
 
 
 
 
 
Data for Question 2 indicates that out of the 39 interventions, 8% (3) interventions were 
issued with a prior notice, 87% (34) of the interventions were not, whilst 5% (2) of  
 
 
Table 7 indicates that 8% (3) of the interventions issued prior notices, 87% (34) did not, 
while for 5% (2) the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
     
Question 3a: Were notices submitted to the Minister within the stipulated time-frames? 
Yes               No                Uncertain              Total     
25 (59%)          9 (26%)         5 (15%)                39 (100%) 
 
 
Table 8: Were notices submitted to Minister within the stipulated time-frames? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 indicates that for 59% (25) of the interventions, notice to the Minister was submitted 
within the time-frame, 26% (9) were not, and for 15% (5) no answer could be determined.  
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Question 3b: Were notices submitted to the NCOP within the stipulated time-frames? 
Yes              No           Uncertain                Total 
24 (62%)         11 (28%)       4 (10%)                  39 (100%) 
 
Table 9: Were notices submitted to the NCOP within the stipulated time-frames? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data gathered for Question 3b indicates that out of the 39 interventions, 62% (24) of the 
submitted the notice to the NCOP within the specified time-frame, 28% (11) did not, while  
Table 9 indicates that for 62% (24) of the interventions, notices to the NCOP were submitted 
within the timeframe, 28% (11) were not, and for 10% (4) no answer could be determined. 
  
Question 4: Is the failure identified in the notice to the Minister and NCOP? 
Yes    No              Uncertain         Total 
38 (97%)  0 (0%) 1 (3%)                     39 (100%) 
 
 
Table 10: Is the failure identified in the notice to the Minister and NCOP? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 indicates that out of the 39 interventions, 97% (38) of the failures were identified in 
the notice to the Minister and the NCOP, 0% (0) were not, while for 3% (1) of the 
interventions the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
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Question 5: Does the failure relate to a legislative obligation?  
Yes    No   Uncertain  Total 
37(94%) 1(3%)  1(3%)  39 (100%) 
 
Table 11: Does the failure relate to a legislative obligation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 indicates that for 94% (37) of the interventions the failure were linked to a 
legislative obligation that has been breached, 3% (1) were not, while for 3% (1) of the 
interventions the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
Question 6: Does the failure relate to an ‘executive obligation as defined in Mnquma? 
Yes    No   Uncertain    Total  
13 (33%) 25 (64%) 1 (3%)               39 (100%) 
 
Table 12: Does the failure in the notice relate to an ‘executive obligation as defined in 
Mnquma? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 indicates that provincial executives were able to relate the failure to an executive 
obligation as defined in Mnquma in 33% (13) of the interventions, 64% (25) were not able to 
do so, while for 3% (1) the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
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Question 7a: Did the Minister dis/approve the intervention within the specified time-frame?  
Yes             No             Uncertain            Total 
11 (28%)        11 (28%)         17 (44%)             39 (100%) 
 
Table 13: Did the Minister dis/approve the intervention within the specified time-
frame?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 indicates that the Minister approved or disapproved 8% (11) of the interventions 
within the specified time-frame, for 28% (11) the Minster did not, while for 44% (17) the 
required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
 
Question 7b: Did the NCOP dis/approve the intervention within the specified time-frame? 
Yes   No   Uncertain       Total  
28 (72%) 1 (3%)             10 (25%)        39 (100%) 
 
Table 14: Did the NCOP disapprove the intervention within the specified time-frame?  
 
Table 12b: Did the NCOP dis/approvethe intervention within specified time-frame? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 indicates that 72% (28) of the interventions were approved or disapproved by the 
NCOP within the specified time-frame, in 3% (1) it did not, while in 25% (10) of the 
interventions the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
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Question 8: Did the provincial executive request extension for the intervention? 
Yes           No                  Uncertain          Total  
8 (21%)        29 (74%)        2 (5%)               39 (100%) 
 
Table 15: Did the provincial executive request an extension for the intervention? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data collated for Question 8 indicates that for 21% (8) of the interventions, there were 
requests made for extensions, in 74% (29) no requests were made, while for 5% (2) of the 
interventions the required documentation was not available to determine an answer.  
5 Summary 
The five years between January 2009 and March 2014 have seen an increase for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139 (1) of the Constitution. This has led to provinces playing 
an increasingly supportive and supervisory role over municipalities. Due to the uncertainty 
with the application of the requirements for the use of aforementioned interventions, eight 
questions were posed to assess the impact of such uncertainties on province’s role in the use 
of interventions. The answers to the questions were derived from the notices to the Minister 
and the NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(i)-(ii) and from progress reports by the Minister and 
the NCOP for aforementioned interventions ranging from January 2009 to March 2014. The 
answers indicate that the steps taken in terms of section 139(1) were at times followed in 
accordance with the provisions laid down in the Constitution or legislation. However, the 
data also indicates that there are difficulties with the application of certain requirements 
which result in provincial executives not always complying with these requirements or 
complete non-compliance with such requirements which in terms of section 139(1) of the 
Constitution are necessary for the use of interventions. This has not only led to some 
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municipalities having to repeat interventions but also some interventions lasting at times for 
several years. These answers will be analysed and discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter.
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Chapter Four 
Analysing the Data 
1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data emanating from the notices to the Minister and the NCOP in terms 
of section 139(2)(a)(i)-(ii). The aim of analysing such data is to assess which of the steps 
necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution were 
complied with and which were not. The progress reports by COGTA and the NCOP  
complement the data acquired from aforementioned notices between January 2009 and March 
2014. By analysing the data, the answers to each of the eight questions were tallied and sorted 
into three categories. The placing of the answers into a particular category determines the extent 
of the compliance of provincial executives with the requirements provided for in the 
Constitution. In this way, the study is able to assess which of the steps necessary for the use of 
section 139(1) interventions have been complied with and which steps presented difficulties. In 
this way, the study ultimately assesses the role of provinces in the use of interventions in terms 
of section 139(1) of the Constitution. The outcome of the answers to the eight questions are 
analysed below but are preceded with a brief discussion of the analysis of data retrieved. 
2 Analysis of data retrieved  
Each of the eight questions needed to be answered with ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘uncertain’ and it is the 
outcome of these answers (as indicated in Table 5 of Chapter Three) which are analysed below.  
2.1 The use of the directive 
Question 1 deals with the question if the relevant provincial executives made use of the directive 
before invoking the intervention in terms of section 139(1)(b) or (c). The directive, being the 
least intrusive intervention in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution, is useful in that it not 
only serves as an instruction to the municipality to remedy the failed executive obligation but 
does so without having to assume the executive responsibilities of the affected municipality. In 
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this way, the provincial executive by invoking the directive is able to fulfil the dual functions of 
remedying the failure and respecting the independence and sovereignty of the municipality. 
Based on the answers in Table 5, only the Umzinyathi, Mnquma, and Indaka municipalities were 
issued with a directive in terms of section 139(1)(a) of the Constitution. At the Umzinyathi and 
Mnquma municipalities (March 2013), the assumption of responsibilities in terms of section 
139(1)(b) were preceded by the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a). However, at the Indaka 
municipality the intervention in terms of section 139(1)(b) was effected in November 2009, 
terminated in December 2013 after significant progress was made, but immediately resumed 
with the directive in terms of section 139(1) (a).  
On the other hand, in the majority of the interventions (33 out of the total of 39 interventions) 
provincial executives did not make use of the directive in terms of section 139(1)(a) for the last 
five years One of the main reasons is the difficulty and delay in placing programs on the agenda 
of the affected provincial executives. The trend is for provincial executives to sidestep the 
issuing of directives despite their usefulness and instead resort to interventions in terms of 
section 139(1)(b).  
2.1.1 Significance on the use of the directive 
The relatively low percentage (8%) of the usage of the directive by provincial executives 
indicates that provinces fail dismally (84% of the time as per the research) to use the directive. 
Thus, the vast majority of provincial executives when resorting to interventions miss out on the 
opportunity to remedy the failure without infringing on the independence of the municipality. In 
addition, by not utilising the directive, the possibility of shortening the duration of the 
intervention is limited as provincial executives choose to resort to the sometimes drawn-out 
interventions in terms of sections 139(1)(b) or (c). 
2.2 The use of the prior notice  
The cooperative principles in Chapter Three as well as the audi alterem partem rule in South 
African law require provinces to afford municipalities the opportunity to make representations 
with regard to problems identified in the notice. In addition to fulfilling the abovementioned 
roles, the prior notice also informs the affected municipality of the prospect of the intervention in 
terms of section 139(1)(a), (b) or (c). 
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With regard to the above, provincial executives issued prior notices before the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Constitution in only three (8%) of the 
interventions. These prior notices relate to the interventions at the Mnquma municipality in 2009 
and a repeat of the intervention in 2013, as well as the Umzinyathi municipality. In the first 
instance, the provincial executive served the Mnquma municipality with prior notice only after 
the Mnquma municipality took legal action against the dissolution of the municipality. The 
repeat of the intervention at Mnquma in terms of section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution in 2013 
was also preceded with a prior notice. 
In the majority of instances (87% in Table 7) the relevant provincial executives did not issue 
prior notices before the use of interventions in terms of sections 139(1)(a), (b) or (c). In these 
instances such municipalities were thus denied the opportunity to make representations with 
regard to the problems identified in the notice. In the two outstanding interventions the study was 
unable to provide answers to determine if a prior notice was issued due to the relevant 
information not being available. The lack of information resulted in the two aforementioned 
interventions being categorised as ‘uncertain’. 
2.2.1 Significance of tallies for issuing prior notices 
In practical terms, the high percentage of non-usage of prior notices (87%) by provincial 
executives means that the affected municipalities are not informed or consulted on matters of 
interest as required by section 41(1)(h)(iii) of the Constitution. This is not only in clear 
contravention of the audi alterem partem rule in South African law but also goes against the 
values and goals of the cooperative principles in Chapter Three of the Constitution.  
2.3 The issuing of notices in terms of section 139(2)(i-ii) 
2.3.1 Issuing to the Minister  
Section 139(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution provides that the relevant provincial executive must 
submit written notices to the Minister within 14 days after the intervention began. In the majority 
of the interventions in Table 13 (59%) the notices were submitted to the Minister within the 
specified time-frame. However, in nine interventions the notices were not submitted within the 
14 working day time limit which effectively means that these nine interventions are in 
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contravention of the provisions in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i). This is largely due to provincial 
executives not adhering to these time-frames. Due to the unavailability of the information 
necessary to determine whether the relevant provincial executives submitted the outstanding 
notices to the Minister within the stipulated time-frames, five (15%) of the answers were 
categorised as ‘uncertain’. 
2.3.2 The issuing of notices to the NCOP 
Section 139(2)(ii) of the Constitution provides that the relevant provincial executive must submit 
a written notice to the NCOP within 14 days. The data reflects that in 24 (62%) out of the 39 
interventions, notices to the NCOP were submitted within the specified time-frame. However, in 
11 (28%) of these interventions the notices were not submitted within the required time-frame. 
Despite these written notices not submitted to the NCOP within the specified time period these 
interventions still went ahead. For 4 (10%) of these interventions the relevant documentation was 
not available to this study and thus categorised as ‘uncertain’.  
2.3.3 Significance of tallies for notices to the Minister and the NCOP 
The majority of the notices by the relevant provincial executives to the Minister and the NCOP 
were submitted within the specified time-frames. On the other hand, for nine of the 39 
interventions the notices were not submitted to the Minister within the time-frame, while in the 
case of the NCOP the notices not submitted within the specified time-frame amounted to 11 
interventions. Despite these interventions going ahead, the late submission of these notices to the 
Minister and the NCOP are in contravention of the provisions in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i)-(ii) 
of the Constitution, which could have an influence on the validity of the interventions if 
challenged in a court of law.  
2.4 Identifying the failure in the notice to the Minister and the NCOP  
In the context of subsection 1 of section 139 of the Constitution the existence of the failed 
obligation is a prerequisite before the relevant provincial executive may exercise its discretion to 
intervene.1 Identifying the failure at the municipality is therefore one of the most important 
                                                 
1 Mnquma para 50. 
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aspects of the provincial executives in the notices to the Minister and NCOP. Table 5 indicates 
that at the majority of the interventions (38 out of the 39 interventions) the relevant provincial 
executives were able to identify the failure at the municipality. Furthermore, there was no 
instance where the relevant provincial executives did not identify the failure at the affected 
municipalities. In practical terms this means that in all the interventions from January 2009 until 
March 2014 the relevant provincial executives identified the failures in the notices to the 
Minister and NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i-(ii) of the Constitution. However, in the case 
of the intervention at the Nzo municipality, the answer tallied as ‘uncertain’ was due to 
documentation not being available to the study (Table 16). The failures mentioned above are 
categorised into three main areas and are discussed below.  
2.4.1 Categorisation of failure 
In the notices to the Minister and NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(a))i)-(ii) of the Constitution 
provincial executives tend to categorise the failure into three main categories: problems of a 
governance nature, problems of financial and administrative nature, and those of a service 
delivery nature. Some municipalities experienced problems related to all three categories while 
others only experienced problems related to two or one of the categories. More specifically, the 
failures in 26 of the interventions were of a governance and financial nature; five of the 38 
interventions were problems related to governance, service delivery and finances; four of the 38 
interventions were of a governance nature only; three of the interventions were of financial 
nature; and the remaining one intervention was related to problems of a service delivery and 
financial nature. None of these municipalities experienced problems related to service delivery 
only. The categorisation of the failures in accordance with the problems at the municipalities is 
outlined below
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Table 16: Categorisation of failure at municipalities 
Governance and Financial  
 
Governance  
Service 
delivery 
& Financial 
Governance Financial  Service 
delivery & 
Financial 
 
Ngaka, Moses Kotane, Tswaing, Madibeng, 
Nala, Matlosana, Thabo Mafutsayane, 
Matlosana, Naledi, Masilonyana, Kou-Kamma, 
Sunday’s River, PixleykaSeme, Mkhondo, 
Lekwa, Indaka, Okhahlamba, Umsunduzi, 
Mtubatuba, Abaqulusi, Uthukela, Ugu District, 
Indaka, Swellendam, Mogalakwena, Tswaing 
Mafikeng 
MaquassiHills, 
Ditsobotla, 
Madibeng 
Emalahleni 
Mnquma 
Mnquma 
Imbabazane 
Umvoti 
ThabaChweu 
Thembisile 
Hani 
Umzinyathi 
Bushbuckridge 
 
Data retrieved from notices to Minister in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i) (2009 – 2014) 
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2.4.2 Significance of identifying the failure 
In almost all instances (97%) the relevant provincial executives identified the problems giving 
rise to the failure at the municipality. These failures were either of a governance, financial or 
service delivery nature. Some municipalities experienced problems related to all three categories, 
others experienced problems related to two or one categories only. In only one instance the study 
was unable to determine an answer due to the documents not being available. What is significant 
is that all the relevant provincial executives (except one) identified the failure at the 
municipality. In terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution the failure is a prerequisite for the 
relevant provincial executives to intervene.  
2.5 Linking the failure at the municipality to a legislative obligation 
Further to identifying the failure, section 139(1) provides that such failure has to be ‘in terms of 
the Constitution or legislation’.1 In this regard, in 37 (which accounts for 94%) of the 
interventions the relevant provincial executives were able to relate the failure at the affected 
municipality to a legislative obligation. On the two occasions where the provincial executive did 
not provide a legal basis for the interventions, this was either as a result of an omission by the 
relevant provincial executive (intervention at Thembisile Hani municipality) or due to the 
documentation necessary (intervention at Alfred Nzo municipality) to determine an answer not 
being available. In essence this means that the provincial executives mostly comply with the 
requirement to link the failed obligation to the provision in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation. Table 17 below demonstrates how the failure is linked to a legislative obligation. 
                                                 
1 S 139(1) 1996 Constitution. 
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Table 17: Linking the failure to a legislative obligation 
Municipality Failure Executive obligation 
PixleykaSeme Governance and Financial S 55 Municipal Systems Act, S 56 Municipal Structures Act 
Mquma Governance Ss 41(3), 152(1), 21 of the Constitution, Ss4(2)(a, b, d, f) 
Municipal Systems Act Ss 21, 32, 73, 74, 99, 111, 112, 115, 
131, 165, 172 MFMA 
Kou Kamma Governance and Financial S 154 Constitution, Ss 133, 127 MFMA 
Ngaka Governance and Financial Ss 4, 29 MSA 1998, S 23 LRA. 
Mkhondo Local  Governance and Financial S 57 Performance Management Act 
ThabaChweu 
Local 
Financial  S 55 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Lekwa Local  Governance and Financial S 56 Municipal Structures Act, S 55 Municipal Systems Act 
Thabo 
Mofutsanyane  
Governance and Financial Ss 39, 28, 32 Municipal Systems Act, Ss 71, 46 MFMA 
Indaka Local  Governance and Financial S 51 Municipal Systems Act, S 152 Constitution, Ss 121, 129 
MFMA 
Okhahlamba Governance and Financial S 51 Municipal Systems Act S 152 Constitution, Ss136, 121, 
129, 165, 166 MFMA 
Umhlabuyalingan
a 
Governance and Financial Ss 51, 52 Ss 51, 52 Municipal Systems Act S 152 Constitution, 
S 131, 136, 138 MFMA  
Nala Local  Governance and Financial Ss 46, 39, 28, 29 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Masilonyana 
Local  
Governance and Financial Ss 46, 39,71 S Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Sundays River  Governance and Financial Ss 51. 52 Municipal Systems Act 
Madibeng Local  Governance, Service 
delivery and Financial 
S 4 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Moses Kotane Governance and Financial S 4 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Tswaing Local  Governance and Financial S 71 MFMA, S 4 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Msunduzi Local  Governance and Financial Ss29, 71, 111, 134 MFMA, S 28 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Thembisile Hani Financial  S 55 Municipal Structures Act 1998  
Naledi Local  Governance and Financial Ss 154, 46, 71 Municipal Systems Act 
Mafikeng Local  Governance,  S 57 Performance Management Act 
Swellendam 
Local  
Governance and Financial Ss 60, S54 A (2), Municipal Systems Act, S 60 MFMA 
Mtubatuba Local Governance and Financial  Ss 51. 52 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Imbabazane Local Governance, Service 
delivery and Financial 
S 152 of the Constitution, S 51, 73 Municipal Systems Act 
Abaqulusi Local Governance and Financial Ss 64(2)(g), 121 MFMA, Ss 46 (1)(b-c), 54 Municipal Systems 
Act 
Bushbuckridge  Service delivery and 
Financial  
S 55 Municipal Systems Act, S 56(2) Municipal Structures Act 
Emalahleni Local  Governance, Service 
delivery and Financial 
S 56 (2) Municipal Structures Act 1998, S 55 Municipal 
Systems Act 2000 
Matlosana Local Governance and Financial Ss51, 54A, 56 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
Maquassi Hills  Governance, Service 
delivery and Financial 
Ss 51, 54A, 56 Municipal Systems Act 2000 
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Ditsobotla Local Governance, Service 
delivery and Financial 
Ss 51, 54A, 56 Municipal Systems Act 2000, S 139 (1) (b) 
Constitution 
Umzinyathi Financial  Ss 121(2), 71, 142, 145, 147, 152, 137, 141, 141(3) MFMA 
Uthukela District Governance and Financial Ss 71, 121, 136(2), 141, 142, 145, 147(1), 137 MFMA 
Ugu District Governance and Financial Ss 131(2)(a), 71, 136(2), 141, 141(3), 142, 145 MFMA S 152 
Constitution 
Mnquma Local Governance Ss 36(5), S 29(1) Municipal Structures Act, Ss60, 66, 68 72 
MFMA 
Umvoti Local  Governance Ss 51, 152 of the Constitution 
Indaka Governance and Financial S 51 Municipal Systems Act, S 152 Constitution, Ss 121, 129 
MFMA 
Madibeng Local  Governance, and Financial S 51 Municipal Systems Act, S 152 Constitution, Ss 121, 129 
MFMA 
Mogalakwena Governance and Financial S 139 (1) (b) S 152 Constitution 
Data retrieved from notices to Minister in terms of section 139(2)(a)(i) (2009 – 2014) 
Out of the 39 interventions, 37 of the notices to the Minister and NCOP provided a legislative 
obligation that has been breached. These obligations are contained in legislation such as 
Municipal Structures Act 19981, Municipal Systems Act 20002, Municipal Finance Management 
Act 20033 and the 1996 Constitution.4  
2.5.1 Significance of tallies for identifying the legal obligation 
In almost all of the interventions the relevant provincial executives linked the failures in the 
notice to the Minister and the NCOP to specific statutory obligations. What is significant is that 
in all the notices to the Minister and NCOP except one the relevant provincial executives 
complied with the requirement in terms of section 139(1), which requires that the failed 
obligation has to be in terms of the Constitution or legislation. 
2.6 Linking the failure to an ‘executive obligation’ as defined in Mnquma 
Question 6 raises the question whether the failure of the municipality is linked to the ‘executive 
obligation’ as defined in Mnquma, According to the judge in Mnquma the mandate of local 
                                                 
1 Ss 4, 29, 29(1) 36(5), 56, 56(2) of the Municipal Structures Act 1998  
2 Ss 4(a)-(d), 28, 29, 32, 39, 51, 52, 54A, 55, 56, 59, 60, 66(1), 67(4), 70, 71, 73 of the Municipal Systems Act 2000 
3 Ss 21, 29, 46, 60, 64 (2)(g), 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 99, 112, 115, 121, 121(2), 127, 129, 131, 131(2)(a), 133, 134, 136   
   (2), 137, 138, 141, 141(3), 142, 145, 147, 147(1), 152, 165, 166, 172 of Municipal Finance Management Act 2003 
4 Ss 21, 41(3), 51, 139 (1) (b), 152, 152(1), 154, 1996 Constitution 
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government is to provide services and for this reason the ‘executive obligations’ of local 
government are of necessity related to those executive obligations which have a direct impact on 
citizens. These obligations are dealt with in section 156(1) of the Constitution and 11(3) of the 
Municipal Systems Act 2000 and are defined as effective administration, provision of services, 
implementation of by-laws, developing policy and good governance and leadership.5 Table 18 
below shows that in only 13 (33%) of the 39 interventions the relevant provincial executives 
were able to relate the failure to the ‘executive obligation’ as defined in Mnquma. The failures 
linked to the ‘executive obligation’ are shown in Table 18 below 
 
                                                 
5 Mnquma paras 61, 64. 
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Table 18: Interventions where the failure relate to an executive obligation  
Municipality Relating the failure to an ‘executive obligation’ as defined in Mnquma 
Ngaka Ineffective administration and poor governance hamper services  
Thabo 
Mofutsanyane 
Municipality failed to function effectively to maintain essential services & meet 
minimum standards 
Nala Undermining of the administration which makes it unable to provide services  
Moses Kotane Poor governance/leadership and administration on ability to provide services 
Naledi Assassination of speaker/attempted murder of municipal manager led to collapse of 
administration 
Mafikeng Non implementation of by laws which hampers effective governing of issues like 
hawking, nuisances 
Swellendam Failing to implement and administer legislation such as failure to appoint a municipal 
manager  
Matlosana Local Poor governance/leadership and administration impact negatively on services such as 
water 
Maquassi Hills  Poor governance/leadership and administration impact negatively on services such as 
water 
Ditsobotla Poor governance/leadership and administration impact negatively on services such as 
water 
Umzinyathi Municipality insolvent not able to pay entity Uthukela Water  
Uthukela 
District 
Financial position is such that it is unable to pay creditors/services - such as water 
provision 
Umvoti Poor governance/leadership and administration impact negatively on services 
Data retrieved from notices to Minister in terms of section 139 (2) (a) (i) (2009 – 2014) 
Those provincial executives who did not link the failure to the executive obligation accounts 
for 25 (62%) of the interventions. In Table 20 below the provisions which have been wrongly 
relied on as constituting failure to comply to an ‘executive obligations’ are indicated as: 
rationale of local government; duties/appointments of officials; and to provide effective 
government. According to Van Zyl J in Mnquma these are ‘duties other than executive 
obligations … and are misconstrued as executive obligations’.1 These duties which according 
to Mnquma are not ‘executive obligations’ are firstly discussed and then outlined in Table 20.  
Rationale of local government 
In Mquma Van Zyl J argues that the ‘executive obligation’ is ‘intended to be limited to 
section 156(1) of the Constitution and 11(3) of the Municipal Systems Act 2000’. and to 
extend the meaning to the provisions would defeat such purposes.2 On a reading of sections 
21, 43, 152 and 154 of the Constitution, as well as sections 4 and 51 of the MSA 2000, it is 
                                                 
1Mnquma para 91 
2 Mnquma para 89.  
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clear that these provisions deal with the rationale and objects of local government rather than 
the term ‘executive obligations’ as defined in Mnquma.  
Duties/appointments of officials  
Sections 39, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 66, 67 of the Municipal Systems Act 2000 deals with labour 
laws and issues with regard to labour law. These provisions also deal with the appointment of 
municipal managers and their duties as well as human resources and the appointment of staff. 
It stands to reason that the provisions do not conform to the requirements which relate to 
‘executive obligations’ as defined in Mnquma.  
Provide effective performance 
On a reading of the provisions in the MFMA (in Table 6) the failures relied on are duties or 
statutory obligations which are meant to provide effective government. For example, sections 
21, 29, and 32 deal with budget process, recovery of unauthorised and wasteful expenditure 
respectively. Section 71 deals with the budget statements while sections 46, 131 121, 129 
deal with submission of reports. The aim of these provisions as well as provisions such as the 
S51 of the Municipal Systems Act 2000 and S4 of the Municipal Structures Act 1998 is to 
provide effective performance by municipalities as envisaged in section 155 (7) of the 
Constitution and not to impose ‘executive obligations’ as defined in Mnquma.3 
Table 19: Interventions where the failure does not relate to an ‘executive obligation’  
Municipality Rationale of local 
government 
Duties/appointments/of 
officials 
Provide Effective 
Performance 
PixleykaSeme S56 MSA 1998,  S 55 MSA 2000  
Mquma S21, 43,152(1) 
Constitution, S4 MSA 
2000 
 
 Ss 21, 32, 63, 65, 73, 74, 
99, 111, 112, 115, 131, 
165, 172 MFMA 
Kou Kamma S 154 Constitution  Ss 133, 127 MFMA 
Mkhondo  S 57 Managers position  
ThabaChweu  S55 MSA 2000  
Lekwa  S55 MSA 2000,S56 MSA 
1998 
 
Indaka S152 Constitution, S51 
MSA 2000 
  
Okhahlamba   S51 MSA 2000 
Umhlabuyalingana S 152 Constitution  Ss 51, MSA 2000, Ss 
131, 136, 138 MFMA 
                                                 
3 Mnquma para 91. 
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Masilyona  PMS Framework, S39 
MSA 2000  
S46, S71 MSA 2000 
Sunday River    
Madibeng   S 4 MSA 1998 
Tswaing  S57 Managers S71 MFMA, S 4 MSA 
1998 
Msundusi   S29, 67, 71,111, 134 
MFMA, 
 S 28 MSA 2000 
Thembisile Hani    
Mtubatuba   S 51 MSA 2000 
Imbabbzane S152 Constitution,S73 
MSA 2000 
 S51 MSA 2000 
Abaqulusi   Ss 64 (2) (g), 121MFMA, 
Ss46, 54 MSA 2000 
Bushbuckridge   S55 MSA 2000, S56 
MSA 1998 
 
Emalahleni  S55 MSA 2000, S56 
MSA 1998 
 
Ugu District S152 Constitution  Ss71, 131(2), 
136(2),141,142, 145 
MFMA 
Mquma  Ss 52, 55, 56, 59, 66 (1), 
67 (4) , 70 MSA 2000 
Ss 60, 66, 68 72 MFMA 
Indaka S 152 Constitution  S 51 MSA 2000, Ss 121, 
129 MFMA 
Madibeng S 4 MSA 1998   
Mogalakwena S 152 Constitution   
Data retrieved from notices to Minister in terms of section 139 (2) (a) (i) (2009 – 2014) 
2.6.1 Significance of relating the failure to an ‘executive obligation’ 
In Mnquma Van Zyl J defined the term ‘executive obligation’ in the context of section 139(1) 
as limited to the obligations in section 156(1) of the Constitution and 11(3) of the Municipal 
Systems Act 2000. The answers to the question if the failure relates to an executive 
obligation indicate that in 25 out of the 39 interventions the failure did not relate to an 
‘executive obligation’ as defined in Mnquma. It thus seems that the definition of ‘executive 
obligation’ in Mnquma is difficult to maintain in practice. The remark by Van Zyl J in 
Mnquma that the term is ‘problematic’4 point to this difficulty and the definition provided in 
the judgement seems to have done little to provide clarity or even a workable solution There 
is thus a need for uniformity and clarity for the term ‘executive obligation’ as section 139 (1) 
                                                 
4Mnquma para 64. 
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clearly provides that the executive obligation must be ‘in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation’.5 
2.7 Approval or disapproval by the Minster within time-frame  
In terms of section 139(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution the Minister must approve or disapprove 
the intervention within 28 days after the intervention began. Table 13 indicates that the 
relevant provincial executives approved or disapproved 11 of the 39 interventions within the 
specified time-frame. The same amount (11), however, were not approved or disapproved by 
the Minister within the specified time-frame. Table 13 also indicates that contrary to what the 
Constitution states the interventions went ahead and did not end as provided for in terms of 
section 139(2)(b)(i). It is also clear that the tallies for the answers categorised as ‘uncertain’ 
for this particular question are quite high (44%) in relation to the answers for the other seven 
questions. This is mostly due to the difficulty with accessing information or the lack of 
cooperation from the department relating to the dates for the approval or disapproval of 
interventions by the Minister. 
 2.7.1 The approval or disapproval by the NCOP within time-frame 
In terms of section 139(2)(b)(ii) the NCOP must approve or disapprove the intervention 
otherwise it must end. The tallies for the approvals or disapproval by the NCOP looks 
different to that of the Minister. First, the tallies for compliance by the NCOP within the 
specified time-frame to approve or disapprove the interventions stand at 28 interventions 
(72%) as opposed to 11 (28%) for the Minister. Also, the tally (3%) for not complying within 
the specified time-frames for the approval or disapproval of the intervention dates is much 
less than the tally for the Minister. Lastly, the access to information for the dates for the 
approval or disapproval was far easier to obtain for the NCOP than those for the Minister. 
This despite the fact that ‘uncertain’ still accounted for 10 (25%) of the interventions due to 
the public information relating to the dates not being readily available from the relevant 
departments.  
2.7.2 The significance of dis/approvals by Minister and the NCOP within time-frames  
It is clear that the time-frame within which the Minister has to approve or disapprove the 
intervention in terms of section 139(2)(b)(i) has proven to be challenging with the result that 
                                                 
5 S 139 (1) 1996 Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 71  
 
11 (28%) of the 39 interventions did not comply with the requirement. The tally for not 
complying would in all probability have been much higher if all the information to determine 
the answers to the dates for approvals or disapprovals had been available. As far as the NCOP 
is concerned, the dates for the approval or disapproval had been complied with in the 
majority (28) of the interventions, which in effect means that there would have been much 
less non-compliance of the dates for approvals or disapprovals of the intervention. What is 
quite clear though is that despite these interventions going ahead when the Minister or the 
NCOP has not signed within the specified time-frames, these interventions are in 
contravention of the provisions in terms of section 139(2)(b)(i) and its validity could be 
challenged in a court of law.  
2.8 The requests for extension of the intervention  
Eight out of the 39 interventions had to be extended due to the problems not having been 
remedied within the initial period requested. The municipalities affected include Ngaka, 
Indaka, Okhahlamba, Msunduzi, Thembisile Hani, Mtubatuba, Abaqusi, and Umvoti 
municipalities. Some of these interventions had to be extended more than once, such as the 
Indaka and Okhahlamba municipalities. The intervention at Okhlahlamba municipality 
started in November 2009 and ended in June 2012, whereas at Indaka the intervention started 
in November 2009 but only ended in December 2013. In addition to the request for 
extensions some of these interventions have had to repeat the interventions, such as at Indaka 
municipality which had an intervention in 2009 and then again in 2013. Other repeats include 
the interventions at Mquma, Ditsobola, and Madibeng municipalities. However, in 29 of the 
39 interventions (74%) no requests were made for the extension of the interventions, which 
seems to suggest that in these instances the problems were remedied within the initial period 
requested. For two of the interventions, Alfred Nzo and Kou Kamma municipalities, the 
answers were categorised as ‘uncertain’ due to the lack of information 
2.8.1 Significance of the request for extension of the interventions 
Those municipalities that had the interventions extended account for 21% whereas those 
without requests for extensions account for 74%. At face value these percentages suggest that 
most interventions were able to remedy the failure at the municipality within the initial period 
in the recovery plan, which is usually six months. In cases such as the Okhahlamba, the 
extensions lasted up to three years and in other cases even longer, as in the case at Indaka 
which lasted for four years. The stark contrast in percentages for those municipalities that 
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extended the interventions and those who did not is therefore misleading if the duration and 
the repeats of some interventions are taken into consideration.  
3 Summary 
This chapter analysed the answers to the eight questions which serve to assess if provincial 
executives comply or not with the procedural requirements which are necessary for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. For this reason the questions 
were structured in a manner that not only assists to assess if provincial executives complied 
with the steps necessary for the use of interventions in terms of section 139 (1) but also to 
assess the effectiveness of such interventions. The answers which are derived from the 
notices to the Ministers and the NCOP indicate that some of steps necessary for the use of 
interventions are not always adhered to, other steps have proven to be difficult or 
‘problematic’ for provincial executives whilst some steps do not pose difficulty at all 
meaning that provincial executives mostly comply with these steps when invoking 
interventions in terms of section 139(1). The findings to these answers and the provision of 
recommendations where necessary are dealt with in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
Findings and Recommendations 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, eight questions were presented to assess if the steps necessary for the use 
of interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution were applied in line with the 
provisions of the Constitution. The answers to these eight questions were tallied and 
subsequently analysed in Chapter Four. This chapter presents the findings to the study as well 
as recommendations where necessary. In doing so, this chapter examines the tallies to the 
‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘uncertain’ responses to each of the eight answers, and these are consigned in 
accordance with one of three groupings. The fourth grouping relates to the findings for the 
request for extension of the intervention. The findings for each of the respective groupings 
identify the steps pertaining to the group which form the basis of the key findings to the 
study. The recommendations at the end of this chapter are made in response to the key 
findings in each group. 
2 Findings to the answers 
The findings to answers in Table 6 are divided into three main groupings, with the fourth 
category consigned to the findings for extension of the particular interventions. The findings 
for the four grouping are outlined below after a discussion of the findings  
2.1 Grouping of the answers 
The first group is restricted to those answers where the clear majority of the questions were 
answered ‘yes’, indicating that provincial executives complied in full or in most part with the 
step necessary for the use of the intervention. The second group is confined to those answers 
where the ‘yes’ is still in the majority but accompanied by a minority ‘no’. The third group is 
confined to those answers where the clear majority was answered with ‘no, indicating that 
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provincial executives have difficulty complying or do not comply at all with the particular 
step necessary for the use of the intervention. Group four pertains to those answers which do 
not fall into any of the three main categories above, as the question probes the issue of the 
extension rather than if the steps applied by the relevant provincial executive conform to the 
provisions of the Constitution. Table 18 outlines the groupings of the steps overleaf. 
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Table 20: Grouping of the steps necessary for use of interventions in terms of S 139 (1)  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 Not problematic Sometimes problematic   Highly problematic 
 Identifying the failure in notice in 
terms of section 139 (2).  
 Relating the failure to a legislative 
obligation.  
 Approval or disapproval of the 
intervention by the NCOP within 
timeframe 
 Submitting notice in terms of S139 (a) 
(i) within timeframe  
 Submitting notice in terms of S139 (a) 
(ii) within timeframe  
 
 Issue of prior notice  
 The use of the directive by the 
provincial executive  
 Relating the failure to the executive 
obligation as defined in Mnquma  
 Approval or disapproval of the 
intervention by the Minister within 
timeframe 
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2.2.1 Findings of group one 
Group one consists of the steps which do not present any problems for provincial executives 
when complying with the provisions for the use of the intervention in terms of section 139(1) 
of the Constitution. It follows that provincial executives always comply or mostly comply 
with these steps which are necessary for the use of the intervention in terms of section 139(1). 
These steps include: identifying the failure at the municipality; linking the failure to a 
legislative obligation; and approval or disapproval of the intervention by the NCOP.  
2.2.2 Findings of group two 
Group two consists of the steps which at times present problems in terms of section 139(1) 
but in most cases do not. These steps includes: submitting the notice to the Minister within 
the specified timeframe; and submitting the notice to the NCOP within the specified 
timeframe. Even though compliance with the respective steps in this group is in the majority, 
non-compliance with the step (even though this is in the minority) is in clear violation to the 
provisions of the Constitution.  
2.2.3 Findings of group three 
Category three consists of the steps which present problems to provincial executives when 
complying with the provisions for the use of the intervention in terms of section 139(1) of the 
Constitution. It follows that provincial executives mostly do not comply with the step 
necessary for the use of the intervention, or at the least have difficulty complying with it. 
These steps includes: the use of the prior notice before the intervention in terms of section 
139 (1); the use of the directive in terms of section 139 (1) (a); relating the failure to an 
executive obligation as defined in Mnquma; and the approval and disapproval by the 
Minister of the intervention. The non-compliance of these steps are in clear violation with the 
provisions of the Constitution or the cooperative principles enshrined in chapter three of the 
Constitution.  
2.2.4 Findings of group four 
Group four addresses the findings for extension of the interventions by the relevant provincial 
executives. These findings indicate that even though the majority of provincial executives 
(74%) did not request to extend the particular interventions, 21% did request such extensions. 
Some of these interventions were extended on more than one occasion, with some of these 
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extensions repeating the particular intervention, such as the interventions at the Indaka 
municipality. It is these requests for extensions of some interventions, along with repetitions 
of some of them, which indicate that the effectiveness of the role of provinces in the use of 
interventions can be questioned, at least in these instances. 
3 Other findings of the study 
3.1 Uncertainty regarding key terms  
There is uncertainty regarding key terms in the context of section 139(1) of the Constitution, 
particularly ‘executive obligations’ and ‘appropriate steps’. This impacted on the use of such 
interventions. These two terms are discussed below. 
3.1.1 ‘Executive obligations’  
At present there is no clear definition in the Constitution or jurisprudence as to what 
constitutes an ‘executive obligation’ in a municipality other than what is defined in the 
Mnquma judgment. This has led to the scenario where provincial executives find it difficult 
to relate the executive obligations with the failure at the municipality, and in doing so tend to   
confuse it with duties other than those of the ‘executive obligations’.  
3.1.2 ‘Appropriate steps’  
The fragmented interpretation of intervention steps in terms of section 139(1)(a)–(c) has led 
not only to uncertainty about its application but overuse of one and at the expense of 
underutilisation of the other. For example, Table 3 indicates that out of the 39 interventions 
for the last five years, 36 accounted for interventions in terms of section 139(1)(b), whereas 
only one was invoked in terms of section 139(1)(a) and two in terms of section 139(1)(c). 
Also, the difficulty provincial executives have in invoking section 139(1)(a) prompts them to 
invoke section 139(1)(b) instead, in order to avoid unnecessary delays and uncertainty  
3.2 Monitoring mechanisms 
The provinces at times lack the capacity to adequately support and monitor local government, 
which can lead to the request for extension of the intervention or even repetition of the 
intervention. In addition, monitoring mechanisms are not always able to signal the failures at 
municipalities, with the result that provincial executive become aware of the problem areas 
only by word of mouth or when the municipality’s total collapse is imminent. What is curious 
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is that Table 14 indicates that municipal failures relating only to service delivery have never 
triggered an intervention. This can be attributed squarely to the lack of monitoring systems 
linked to service delivery. In certain instances some interventions could have been prevented 
if the mechanisms, processes and procedures in terms of section 105 of the Municipal 
Systems Act had been effective or the duration of the interventions shortened had the 
province  been fully capacitated to support and monitor the affected municipalities.   
3.3 Fragmented approach  
At present there are no guidelines for provinces when they invoke interventions in terms of 
section 139(1). This has resulted in some provinces being less compliant than others with 
certain requirements; in some instances section 139(1) was applied outside of what is 
constitutionally permitted. For example, in some provinces MECs have read section 139(1), 
in particular the power to dissolve councils, as a power that can be wielded with relatively 
little procedural rigour or prior engagement, as was the case at the Naledi municipality. This 
is corroborated by the graphs in Table 9, which indicate that in the majority of interventions 
very little or no prior engagement takes place before the intervention. The same result is 
evident with the directive, where in only two instances the directive in terms of section (1) (a) 
were invoked whilst table 9 indicates that in other instances the directive was completely 
disregarded.  
4 Recommendations 
4.1 Legislation  
In order to address the issue of effective monitoring in terms of section 155(6)(a) of the 
Constitution, the principles in Chapter Three of the Constitution – which guide the 
establishment, systems and processes for monitoring – should be embodied in legislation 
instead of being mere principles. For example section 41(1)(h) of the Constitution which calls 
for the organs of government to consult and inform each other should be embodied in the 
legislation and ensure that the prior notice is a legislative requirement. This would be more 
effective than leaving it a matter for interpretation as to whether the principles of 
intergovernmental principles had been complied with. Legislative embodiment of the 
principles in Chapter three of the Constitution should be undertaken in conjunction with the 
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monitoring mechanisms, processes and procedures envisaged in section 105 of the Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
4.2 Clarity of key terms 
The clarification of key terms such as the ‘appropriate steps’ and ‘executive obligations’ of 
the municipality would go a long way towards enabling provincial executives to conform to 
the provisions of section 139(1) of the Constitution. Hence, clear guidelines should be 
provided in policy directives from the Department; similarly, legislation should spell out 
what constitute ‘appropriate steps’ and ‘executive obligations’ in the context of subsection 1 
of section 139 of the Constitution. A check if provincial executives complied with the 
requirements related to these two aspects should form part of the review by the Minister and 
the NCOP in terms of section 139(2)(c).  
4.3 Uniform Approach 
The purpose of legislation and the provision of clear policy guidelines should be to ensure 
that provinces adopt a uniform approach to the procedural requirements for the use of 
interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. Having the legal framework in 
place for a uniform approach would make the application of the requirements more consistent 
and coherent and thus easier to monitor. For example, a uniform approach would enable the 
NCOP to conduct regular reviews of the intervention efficiently and effectively. Uniformity 
would make the application of the requirements for using the interventions predictable and 
less confusing, and would require less guidance and involve fewer legal challenges. 
 4.4 Directive to be given more consideration  
The directive in terms of section 139(1) (a) is at present ‘underutilised’. More consideration 
should be given to it to remedy the failure at the municipality. In accordance with the 
Mnquma judgement, the directive is regarded as a formal intervention authorised by the 
provincial executive. The difficulty of putting the issue on the agenda of the provincial 
Cabinet to seek authorisation for the intervention in terms of section 139 (1)(a) plays a part in 
MECs passing over the directive, opting rather to invoke section 139(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. This situation could be rectified if MECs were empowered to invoke section 
139(1)(a) without first having to seek authorisation from the provincial executive. This could 
be done by effecting the delegation of power from the provincial executive.  
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The principle of cooperative government essentially forms the basis for any intervention in 
terms of section 139(1)(a)–(c). Co-operative governance, however, should not only relate to 
supporting and monitoring the municipality. In performing their functions, the Constitution 
provides that provincial executives should do it ‘in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere’.1 The 
directive is able to fulfill these dual functions in that it serves as an instruction to the 
municipality to fulfil the failed obligation and in doing so does not impede on the authority of 
local government. By delegating the power from executive provincial executives to effect 
interventions, the directive should be given more consideration by provincial executives 
unless it can be shown by the facts that the directive would not be functional.  
5 Summary  
The flexibility provinces enjoy with regard to legislation and policies when they invoke 
interventions under section 139(1) has led to a fragmented approach, with the result that such 
interventions are often used inconsistently or unconstitutionally. Coupled with the uncertainty 
around key terms in the context of subsection 1 of section 139 of the Constitution, provincial 
executives have found some steps necessary for the use of interventions ‘problematic’ or 
difficult to apply. This was corroborated in the Mnquma judgement, where relating the failure 
to the executive obligations was described as ‘problematic’2 and the judge highlighted the 
need for clarification of the key in terms of section 139 (1) of the Constitution. In practice 
therefore, it happens that some steps necessary for the use of interventions are at times not 
complied with. or totally disregarded,  
The overall situation justifies the call for a uniform approach for the use of interventions. 
This could be achieved by drafting legislation and clear policy guidelines that ensure a 
coherent, consistent and uniform approach when provincial executives invoke interventions 
in terms of section 139(1)(a)–(c) of the Constitution. The legislation should include clear 
guidelines for monitoring and support by provinces of local government in line with the 
guidelines and policy directives from COGTA, SALGA and NCOP. These should be drafted 
in an inclusive manner so that there is a workable consensus among the stakeholders who will 
be affected and those responsible for the implementation of such legislation. 
                                                 
1 S 41 (1) (g) 1996 Constitution 
2 Mnquma para 54. 
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